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SEARCH AND SEIZURE IN ALASKA:
A COMPREHENSIVE REVIEW
JEFFREY

M. FELDMAN*

"We recognize that the law of search and seizure is complex
and often difficult to apply. That the permutations of human
behavior sometimes carry police officers into situations
which demand decisions close to the line of unconstitutional
intrusions is, perhaps, an inevitability, but the rights and
liberties secured by the Federal and State constitutions are
paramount and they will be protected." Anderson v. State'
INTRODUCTION

In the eighteen years since Alaska achieved statehood, fifty-two
cases involving issues of search and seizure have reached the Alaska
Supreme Court. This article will analyze these cases with an eye
towards outlining the law of search and seizure in Alaska, isolating
those areas in which the Alaska Supreme Court has departed from
prevailing search and seizure doctrine, and using past decisions to
predict the probable outcomes to search and seizure issues still unresolved in Alaska.
Search and seizure law is grounded in the Fourth Amendment to
the United States Constitution 2 which preserves the right of citizens to
...
be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
3
unreasonable searches and seizures, . . ." The Alaska Constitution
provides similar protection, but adds the right of citizens to be secure
in their "property" as well. In this article, unless otherwise specified, the term "fourth amendment" is used to refer to rights
secured 6y both the state and federal constitutions. The Alaska Su* B. A., 1972 and J. D., 1975, Northeastern University; member, Alaska and
Rhode Island bars; Assistant Public Defender, Alaska Public Defender Agency; Law
Clerk, Alaska Supreme Court, 1975-1976.
1. 555 P.2d 251 (Alaska 1976).
2. U.S. CONST., amend. IV, provides:

The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated and
no warrants shall issue but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or
things to be seized.
3. ALASKA CONST. art. I, § 14, provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, and other
property, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall
not be violated. No warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause supported by
oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and
the persons or things to be seized.
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preme Court has noted in several cases4 that Alaska is not bound by the
construction of the federal constitution and that the court is free to
interpret the provisions of the state constitution more expansively than
the comparable federal constitutional provisions. 5 Thus, areas in which
Alaska has broken from federal search and seizure laws are identified
throughout this article.
This article views Alaska search and seizure law from several
perspectives. Part I examines searches and seizures which are not
governed or regulated by the fourth amendment. Cases in this area
include searches by private persons, seizures of items in plain view,
and searches of areas in which there is no reasonable expectation of
privacy.
Part II discusses searches with warrants. It includes a discussion
of the constitutional requirement for a search warrant and the procedure on appeal for reviewing the issuance and sufficiency of a warrant.
Most Alaska cases in this area have focused on either the sufficiency of
the affidavit in support of a search warrant or the sufficiency of the
warrant itself to sustain the search or seizure of a particular area or
object.
Part III discusses searches without warrants and includes a
discussion of the various exceptions to the warrant requirement.
Among those exceptions are inventory searches, consent searches,
stop and frisks, searches incident to arrest, and exigency searches
(searches following "hot pursuit," emergency searches, or searches
justified by the mobility of an object).
Part IV categorizes and analyzes Alaska search and seizure cases
according to the object or area searched. In the discussion the cases are
separated into three broad areas: searches of premises, searches of
persons, and searches of automobiles. The particular rules applicable
to each group are identified.
Finally, Part V breaks down Alaska's search and seizure cases by
author, isolating individual philosophies and styles among the present
members of the Alaska Supreme Court.
As Justice Edmond Burke, writing for the majority in Anderson
v. State,6 stated, ".

.

. the law of search and seizure is complex and

often difficult to apply." The purpose of this article is to transform
Alaska's tapestry of search and seizure cases into a more focused and
comprehensible picture.
4. Smith v. State, 510 P.2d 793 (Alaska 1973); Baker v. City of Fairbanks, 471 P.2d
386 (Alaska 1970).
5. The state is, of course, bound by the minimum requirements of the federal
constitution. See, e.g., Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1963). The Alaska Supreme Court
noted in Ellison v. State, 383 P.2d 716, 718 (Alaska 1963), however, that article 1, section
14 of the state constitution contains "an even broader guarantee against unreasonable
searches and seizures than does the Fourth Amendment to the Constitution of the United
States."
6. 555 P.2d 251 (Alaska 1976).
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SEARCHES AND SEIZURES NOT GOVERNED By THE FOURTH
AMENDMENT AND ARTICLE I, SECTION 14.

Police officers may bbtain evidence by three means which are not
governed or regulated by the Fourth Amendment proscription against
unreasonable searches and seizures. First, searches and seizures by
private persons acting in a purely private capacity and not at the
direction or behest of government agents 7 are not subject to constitutional requirements of reasonableness. 8 Second, observations of evidence in plain view by a police officer who is lawfully in a place from
which such observations are made 9 do not constitute a "search."'°
Third, searches and seizures may be performed in public areas or
places in which a person has retained too small a privacy interest to
mandate the invocation of constitutional protection" l because the protection of the Fourth Amendment extends only to those areas in which
a person has a "reasonable expectation of privacy."'
Private Person Searches
In cases involving searches by private persons (hereinafter called
private persons searches) the Alaska Supreme Court has focused on the
relationship between the private person conducting the search and
government agents. ' 3 Reliance on this relationship as an analytical tool
is derived from the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals' decision in Corngold v. United States.'"
In Corngold, government agents had detected radio-activity
emanating from a package placed with an airline for shipment. After
informing the airlines agent that the defendant had used a false name
on the waybill, the government agents and the employees of the carrier
together opened the package which contained illegally imported
watches. The Court of Appeals held that while the search had the
"form" of an authorized carrier inspection, in "substance" it was a
search aided by the carrier solely for the benefit of the government.'"
A.

7. Stange v. State, 559 P.2d 650 (Alaska 1977); State v. Stump, 547 P.2d 305 (Alaska
1976); J.M.A. v. State, 542 P.2d 170 (Alaska 1975); Bell v. State, 519 P.2d 804 (Alaska
1974). See also Burdeau v. McDowell, 256 U.S. 465, 475, (1921); Corngold v. United

States, 367 F.2d I (9th Cir. 1966).
8. See cases cited in note 7 supra.
9. Daygee v. State, 514 P.2d 1159, 1162 (Alaska 1973); Weltz v. State, 531 P.2d 502,
505 (Alaska 1967).
10. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, (1971); State v. Davenport, 510 P.2d
78 (Alaska 1973); Klockenbrink v. State, 472 P.2d 958 (Alaska 1970); Stevens v. State,
443 P.2d 600 (Alaska 1968).
II. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967); Smith v. State, 510 P.2d 793 (Alaska
1973). See also Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. (1968).
12. See cases cited in note II supra.
13. See State v. Stump, 547 P.2d 305 (Alaska 1976); Bell v. State, 519 P.2d 804
(Alaska 1974); McGalliard v. State, 470 P.2d 295 (Alaska 1970).
14. 367 F.2d I (9th Cir. 1966).
15. Id. at 5.
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The participation of the government agents subjected the 16search to the
reasonableness requirements of the Fourth Amendment.
The propriety of private persons searches was first raised in
Alaska in McGalliard v. State. 17 In that case, the defendant, McGalliard, was a scrap metal dealer who had been under surveillance by
police investigators for involvement in shipping stolen goods. Police
officers persuaded the terminal manager of the shipper used by the
defendant to call the police whenever McGalliard loaded a van for
shipment. When the defendant subsequently loaded a van, the terminal
manager summoned the police. Two officers, together with the manager, broke the seal to the van and commenced a search. I8
On appeal, -the Alaska Supreme Court held that because the
shipper had retained, in accordance with its tariff, a general unrestricted right of access to the interior of the van, 19 the shipper had the
authority to consent to a search of the van by police officers. 20 By
focusing on the right of the shipper to tender a valid consent to the
search, the court conceded by implication that the search had been
executed with sufficient government complicity so as to be subject to
the Fourth Amendment. Although by-passing a "private persons"
search analysis, the court did note its agreement with the reasoning and
approach of Corngold.2 1 Had the shipper not retained such a broad
right of access, it is likely that the court would have declined to sustain
the search.
Four years later, in 1974, the Alaska Supreme Court again addressed the problem of private persons searches in its first airport
search case. In Bell v. State22 an airlines agent had become suspicious
of the contents of an airfreight shipment to the defendant.23 After
dropping the package, the agent determined that the box contained
several green plastic bags, one of which was ripped, revealing vegetable matter. Subsequently, an airport security guard called by the
airlines employee, removed some of the material from the box, and
turned both the box and the material over to the state police on their
arrival. Citing and distinguishing Corngold, the supreme court held
that the initial search by the airlines agent was not governed by the
Fourth Amendment because government agents had neither initiated
nor participated in the search. Justice Boochever, writing for the
majority, explained:"A search by a private citizen not acting in con16.
17.
18.
19.

Id.at 6.
470 P.2d 275 (Alaska 1970).
Id.at 276.
Id.at 279.

20. Id.at 280.
21. Id. at 289 n.8.
22. 519 P.2d 804 (Alaska 1974).
23. The agent's suspicions were connected to the defendant's appearance ("long
dirty hair") and past shipments which had aroused the agent's concern.
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junction with or at the direction of the police does not violate the
constitutional prohibition against unreasonable searches and
seizures. " 24 With respect to the search by the airport security guard,
the court held that the guard was an agent of the state for the purposes
of search and seizure analysis.2 5
Another private person search case, J.M.A. v. State, 26 involved
the search of a minor's bedroom and personal belongings by his foster
parent, who was paid and licensed by the state. Suspicious of possible
drug activity by J.M.A., the foster mother searched his jacket and
found marijuana. The foster mother called a state social worker who
arrived at the home accompanied by a state trooper who seized the
marijuana and placed J.M.A. in detention. The supreme court confronted the issue of whether the foster parent was an agent of the state
for the purposes of the search of the juvenile's personal effects.
Citing its previous decision in Bell, the court reiterated that a
search by a private person not acting at the direction of or in conjunc27
tion with the police is not governed by the Fourth Amendment.
Moreover, the court held that the Fourth Amendment does not apply to
searches by government agents who are acting for a private purpose
outside the scope of law enforcement. 28 In applying this rule the court
adopted a test applied by the Oregon Supreme Court 29 that did not
measure government involvement by the primary occupation of the
30
actor, but by the capacity in which he acts at the time in question.
Thus, while the court conceded that the foster parent was an agent of
the state for some purposes, the foster parent acts in a private capacity
in managing the home for herself and her family. 3 1 Since the search of
J.M.A.'s effects was not made pursuant to any law enforcement duties
which the foster parent had, it was not subject to the Fourth Amend32
ment prohibition.
One weakness of the decision in J.M.A. is the court's failure to
acknowledge that while the nature of the foster parent's responsibilities
may have been unrelated to law enforcement, the response of the foster
parent involved an element of state action not ordinarily present in the
parent-child relationship. The summoning of the state social worker,
24. 5i9 P.2d 804, 807 (Alaska 1974).
25. The court found that because the vegetable matter was in plain view by the time
the guard arrived, and because the guard recognized the materials to be marijuana by
virtue of his prior narcotics training, his intrusion was justified. The search and seizure
by the state police officer was similarly sustained as within plain view. See Part I, section
B, "The Plain View Doctrine," infra.
26. 542 P.2d 170 (Alaska 1975).
27. Id. at 174.
28. Id.
29. State v. Pearson, 15 Or. App. I, 6-7 (1973).
30. 542 P.2d 170, 174 (Alaska 1975).

31. Id.
32. Id. at 175.
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who arrived with a state trooper, could have been deemed sufficient
evidence that the foster parent was acting as an agent of the state to
bring the search within the scope of the Fourth Amendment.
The court faced another airport search in State v. Stump." Stump
involved the conduct of an airlines employee who opened a parcel and
observed a packet of white powder. After repacking the box, the
employee summoned the police who, on their arrival, stood by while
the employee again unpacked the box. The bag of white powder was
removed by the police and was identified as contraband. Again relying
on Corngold, the supreme court held that the initial intrusion by the
employee did not constitute an illegal search because he had acted in a
purely private capacity, not as an agent of the state. 3 4 In a terse
treatment of the second search, the court simply stated that because
there was no indication that the second intrusion had been initiated or
it, too, was not subject to the Fourth Amenddirected by the police,
35
ment requirements.
While the record in Stump did not indicate whether the police
officers had directed the second search, it was evident that "but for"
the presence of the police, the airlines agent would not have opened
and unpacked the box again at that time. This "but for" test closely
approximates the analysis applied in Corngold and has been cited with
approval in several Alaska cases. 36 In Stump, the majority was apparently trying to avoid the problem of permitting the propriety of a search
to be determined by whether the airlines employee leaves the package
unpacked and opened, as in Bell, thereby exposing the contents to
plain view, or repacks the parcel and then reopens it in the presence of
the officers, as in Stump.
By glossing over the presence and involvement of the officers
during the second search in Stump, however, the court diminished the
utility of the "involvement" and "capacity" tests previously used in
analyzing private person searches. Both the involvement test and the
capacity test focus on the relationship between the person making the
search and government agents. The involvement test considers the
amount of participation by government agents in the intrusion while
the capacity test considers whether or not the private person's activities
were motivated by law enforcement purposes. The second search in
Stump was manifestly for law enforcement purposes and was made
purely for the benefit of the government.
33. 547 P.2d 305 (Alaska 1976).
34. Id. at 307.
35. Id. at 308.
36. Stange v. State, 559 P.2d 650, (Alaska 1977); State v. Stump, 547 P.2d 305
(Alaska 1976); Bell v. State, 519 P.2d 804 (Alaska 1974); McGalliard v. State, 470 P.2d
295 (Alaska 1970).
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Most recently, in Stange v. State,3 7 the supreme court encountered still another airport search. In Stange, the airlines agent, suspicious of the identity of the consignee of a parcel, opened a carton,
observed its contents, and then resealed it. Subsequently, the box was
again opened by the airlines employee in the presence of security
officers and later the contents were displayed to an investigator for the
state troopers. The supreme court ruled that the prior decision in
Stump controlled the outcome of Stange.38 Specifically, the court held
that the intrusions into the parcel constituted private person searches,
not governed by the Fourth Amendment. 9
Finally, in Schraff v. State' the court considered a private person
search conducted by a friend of the defendant. The defendant had been
found intoxicated and incapacitated. At the request of police officers, a
friend of the defendant removed Schraff's wallet and handed it to the
officers present, presumably to confirm his identity. While examining
the wallet, a foil packet, subsequently found to contain contraband,
was observed. Again relying on Corngold, and citing its reasoning in
McGalliard and Bell, the court concluded that: "Not only was (the
officer) present at the time of the search, but he initiated it by requesting Schraff's wallet, and then participated in it by rifling through the
wallet. Obviously,
(the friend's) conduct was strictly for the govern4
ment's benefit."

1

Corngold is still the source and focal point of Alaska's treatment
of private persons searches. However, Stump, Stange, and, to a lesser
extent, J.M.A. all reflect an unfortunate eroding of the core concept of
Corngold, which was aimed at prohibiting not only unreasonable
searches by government agents, but unreasonable searches by private
persons as well where they are executed for a government purpose or at
government direction or instigation.
B.

Plain View Searches.
The second area of cases involving searches and seizures not
governed by the Fourth Amendment involves application of the plain
view doctrine. The doctrine finds its roots in the United States Supreme Court decisions in Harrisv. United States4 2 and Ker v. California43 which held that the mere observation of items which are in plain
37. 559 P.2d 650 (Alaska 1977).
38. Both Stump and Stange involve a very narrow and technical reading by the court
of what the record on appeal reflected and what inferences could be reasonably
drawn. In both cases the court declined to scrutinize the conduct of the airlines employees and draw the rather obvious inferences with regards to the motivations of their
conduct.
39. 559 P.2d at 653.
40. 544 P.2d 834 (Alaska 1975).
41. Id. at 840.
42. 390 U.S. 234 (1968).
43. 374 U.S. 23 (1963).
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view or which are opened and apparent is not a search. Evidence based
on such an observation is admissible so long as the observing officer
44
was legally in the position from which the observation was made
Several early Alaska search and seizure cases applied a plain view
analysis. 45 While these cases did not specifically denominate the plain
view doctrine as the controlling principle, the court frequently analyzed cases in terms of whether a "search" had occurred. The first step
in this analysis routinely involved applying the definition of a search
adopted from the California case of People v. West.' 6 There, a search
was defined as:
a prying into hidden places for that which is concealed
and that the objects searched for has been hidden or intentionally put out of the way. While it has been said that
searching is a function, it is generally held that the4 7 mere
looking at that which is open to view is not a search.
Having analyzed the facts of particular cases in the context of this
definition, the Alaska Supreme Court dealt with plain view searches by
holding that the intrusion, or the observation of an item in plain view,
did not rise to the level of a search. 4 Most of the more difficult and
interesting cases involving applications of the doctrine have involved
either one or two issues: whether a police officer was lawfully in a
position from which the observation was made or whether the intrusion
or "prying" went beyond the "mere observation" permitted.
In Pope v. State, 49 a police officer arrived at the scene of a
homicide and retrieved a gun from the front seat of the defendant's car.
The supreme court, citing its prior decision in Stevens v. State,5" held
that the seizure of the gun did not violate the defendant's constitutional
rights. Because the gun was lying on the front seat of the car in plain
view, the court reasoned, it was not the product of a search at all. 51
Quoting Harris v. United States, 52 the court stated that: "It has long
44. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971); Johnson v.United States, 333
U.S. 10 (1948); Anderson v. State, 555 P.2d 251 (Alaska 1976). See also, Annot. Search

and Seizure: Observation of Objects in Plain View - Supreme Court Cases, 29 L.Ed.2d
1067 (1972).
45. Stevens v. State, 443 P.2d 600 (Alaska 1968); Weltz v. State, 431 P.2d 502
(Alaska 1967); Merrill v. State, 423 P.2d 686 (Alaska 1967); Brown v. State, 372 P.2d 785
(Alaska 1962).
46. 144 Cal. App.2d 214, 300 P.2d 729 (1956).
47. Id. at 219.
48. See, e.g.,
Merrill v. State, 423 P.2d 686 (Alaska 1967); Brown v. State, 372 P.2d
785 (Alaska 1962). While the plain view doctrine has frequently been grouped conceptually, with the several exceptions to the warrant requirement, the "no search" approach
adopted by the Alaska court provides a more accurate analytical framework. Simply
stated, plain view observations do not constitute a search; by definition, therefore, they
do not intrude upon constitutionally protected rights.
49. 478 P.2d 801 (Alaska 1970).
50. 443 P.2d 600 (Alaska 1968).

51. 478 P.2d 801, 805 (Alaska 1970).
52. 390 U.S. 234 (1968).
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been settled that objects falling into plain view of an officer who has a
right to be in the position to have53that view are subject to seizure and
may be introduced into evidence. "
Similarly, in two cases involving searches in connection with
fishing vessels, the Alaska Supreme Court sustained the plain view
observations of officers on the grounds that the officers were lawfully
in a position from which such observations were made. In Klockenbrink v. State54 the court held that the observations of an officer who
was on board a vessel effecting a legal arrest did not constitute a
search. 51 Consequently, evidence based on such observations was
admissible so long as the observing officer was legally in the position
56
where the observations were made. Similarly, in Nathansonv. State
the court held that the seizure of crab pots placed in the water was not
amendment because the pots, and the buoys,
governed by the fourth
57
were in plain view.
Three cases have questioned the extent to which police officers
may probe and examine items to determine their seizable qualities, if
any, and still stay within the parameters of the plain view doctrine. In
Erickson v. State,5 8 police officers opened a suitcase which had been
brought to the station by a citizen. The suitcase was opened by police
officers and was found to contain marijuana. The Alaska Supreme
Court rejected the contention that the suitcase was in plain view
explaining that it was inherently impossible for the contents of a closed
opaque container to be in plain view regardless of the size of the
container or the material of which it was made. 59 Significantly, the
court specifically rejected the argument that the contents of the suitcase
were in "constructive" plain view. Quoting Justice Traynor, of the
California Supreme Court, Justice Erwin in Erickson stated:
This contention overlooks the difference between probable
cause to believe contraband will be found, which justifies the
issuance of a search warrant, and observation of contraband
in plain sight, which justifies seizure without a warrant.
However strongly convinced officers may be that a search
will reveal contraband, their belief, whether based on the
sense of smell, or other source, does not justify a search
without a warrant. 60
Another marijuana case, Daygee v. State,61 involved a bag of
marijuana discovered in the back seat of an automobile after the police
officer, who had stopped the vehicle, illuminated that area of the car
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.

Id.at 236.
472 P.2d 958 (Alaska 1970).
Id.at 961.
554 P.2d 456 (Alaska 1976).
Id. at 460.
507 P.2d 508 (Alaska 1973).
Id. at 513.
Id. at 514.
514 P.2d 1149 (Alaska 1973).
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with his flashlight. The Alaska Supreme Court held that the fact that
the officer's view was aided by a flashlight was irrelevant, the flashlight having merely
illuminated that which would have been visible in
62
day.
of
light
the
Officers in Anderson v. State63 executing a search warrant for
drugs discovered several photographic slides which were, on their
face, innocuous. Exposing the slides to the light, however, revealed
images of unlawful sexual activity. The supreme court held that the
observations made by the police officers while holding the slides to the
light were not sustainable as within their plain view. 64 The intrusion of
the officers in displaying the photograph slides was sufficient to
constitute a search which was not authorized by the warrant, which
merely permitted a search of the defendant's apartment for drugs and
related paraphernalia. In so holding, the supreme court in Anderson
adopted the "immediately apparent" test of Coolidge v. New Hampshire;65 the seizure of the slides was condemned because it was not
immediately apparent to the officers that the slides constituted evidence of a crime.
In several cases the Alaska Supreme Court has articulated additional requirements to sustain proper invocation of the plain view
doctrine. Thus, the court held in State v. Davenport66 that there must
be a nexus between the item to be seized and criminal behavior. 67 The
Davenport rule was followed in State v. Spiet 68 where the court held
that plain view alone will never justify an entry into a private residence. In Spietz, officers entered a residence after observing from the
front porch a tub of what they believed was marijuana. Plain view of
evidence of a crime, the court held, merely furnishes probable cause to
believe that a crime has been committed. Probable cause, in itself,
does not justify a warrantless search and seizure of evidence, because
absent exigent circumstances, a search warrant must first be obtained
from an impartial judicial officer.6 9 Spietz and Daygee, taken together, reflect an interesting analytical weakness in the Alaska Su62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.

Id. at 1162. See also Annot. 48 A.L.R.3d 1178 (1973).
555 P.2d 251 (Alaska 1976).
Id. at 259.
402 U.S. 443 (1971).
510 P.2d 1978 (Alaska'1973).
This connection to criminal behavior parallels the requirements articulated by

the United States Supreme Court in Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971). In
applying the requirement that there be a nexus between the item to be seized and
criminal behavior, the Alaska Supreme Court subsequently held in Anderson v. State,
555 P.2d 404 (Alaska 1976), that the seizable nature of an item must be "immediately
apparent" to an officer to sustain the seizure following a plain view observation. In
Anderson the court invalidated the seizure of photographic slides by an officer on the
grounds that until the officer displayed the slides to the light, it was not "immediately
apparent" to him that they constituted seizable matter.
68. 531 P.2d 521 (Alaska 1975).
69. See also Robinson v. State, 489 P.2d 1271 (Alaska 1971).
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preme Court's treatment of plain view problems. In Daygee and Spietz
police officers observed a contraband substance, marijuana, from
outside of a car and from outside of a house, respectively. In Daygee
the subsequent entry into the car by the police officer and the seizure of
the marijuana was sustained. In Spietz, however, the court reasoned
that the plain view observations of the marijuana merely furnished
probable cause to believe that a crime was being committed. The court
then stated that probable cause in itself does not justify a warrantless
seizure of evidence and absent exigent circumstances a warrant must
be first obtained. This analysis, which focuses on the requirement for
either a warrant or exigent circumstances to sustain a seizure, even
following the plain view observation of a contraband substance, was
noteably missing in the Daygee case. Absent in Daygee was any
consideration of why the observations of the marijuana in the back seat
of the car by the police officer justified the intrusion into the car and
the subsequent seizure. While the distinction between Daygee and
Spietz would appear to be the mobility of the automobile in Daygee,
Alaska has never adopted the mobility exception to the warrant requirement.
An open question remains in Alaska with respect to the standard
of certainty required to justify a plain view seizure. Some cases have
indicated that clear and convincing proof of the presence of contraband°
seizure.7
or seizable matter must be present to justify a warrantless
72
71
Other cases, however, have left the issue open. Daygee v. State
held that it was not necessary that the contraband be positively identified before it could be seized; it was sufficient that the officer had
"cause to believe" that a misdemeanor was being committed in his
presence.73 And in Bell v. State74 the majority opinion held that
positive identification was not required, saying the "officers are not
required to eliminate every farfetched conjectural hypothesis before
seizing an item as contraband." 75 Justice Rabinowitz dissented in that
case, however, and he was of the opinion that the record on appeal did
not establish the "clear and convincing evidence," required to sustain
the plain view seizure, specifically, that the packages contained contraband.7776 The same issue was the subject of dispute in State v.
Stump,

in which Justice Erwin relied on the standard applied by the

70. See Daygee v. State, 514 P.2d 1149 (Alaska 1973); State v. Stump, 547 P.2d 305,
308 (Alaska 1976) (Dimond J., dissenting).
71. Schraff v. State, 544 P.2d 834 (Alaska 1975); Bell v. State, 519 P.2d 804 (Alaska
1974); Daygee v. State, 514 P.2d 1149 (Alaska 1973).
72. 514 P.2d 1149 (Alaska 1973).
73. Id.at 1162-63.
74. 519 P.2d 804 (Alaska 1974).
75. M. at 808.
76. Id. at 810.
77. 547 P.2d 305 (Alaska 1976).

UCLA-ALASKA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 7: 75

majority in Daygee, 8 while Justice Dimond, in his dissenting opinion,
evidence" test used by Justice
adopted the "clear and convincing 79
Rabinowitz in his dissent in Daygee.
Searches of Areas Where There Is No Reasonable Expectation of
Privacy
The third area of searches and seizures not governed by the Fourth
Amendment involves police intrusions into areas in which there is no
reasonable expectation of privacy.80 As the United States Supreme Court
stated in Katz v. United States:
The fourth amendment protects people, not places. What a
person knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own
home or office, is not a subject of fourth amendment protection. But what he seeks to preserve as private, even in an
area accessible to the public, may be constitutionally protected."
Expanding on this theme in Terry v. Ohio,82 the supreme court
added: ". . ; and wherever an individual may harbor a reasonable
'expectation of privacy', he is entitled to be free from unreasonable
governmental intrusion. 8 3"
Thus, searches and seizures by police officers of areas in which a
person has not retained a reasonable expectation of privacy do not
violate the Fourth Amendment.
The Alaska Supreme Court first adopted this position in Smith v.
State.' 4 The Smith court also adopted a test for determining the
existence of a reasonable expectation of privacy, a test derived from
Justice Harlan's separate concurrence in Katz. 5 Justice Harlan's formulation is a two-pronged test of the reasonableness of an expectation
of privacy. First, the person must have exhibited a subjective expectation of privacy; second, his expectation must be one that society is
prepared to recognize as reasonable.
While the majority of the Alaska Supreme Court adheres to the
Harlan test, Justice Rabinowitz, in his dissent in Smith, criticized the
Harlan test, explaining that establishing a person's subjective expectaC.

78. Daygee v. State, 514 P.2d 1149 (Alaska 1973).
79. Id. See also Schraff v. State, 544 P.2d 834 (Alaska 1975).
80. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
81. Id. at 351-52 (citations omitted).
82. 392 U.S. I (1968). See also Murray and Aitken, Constitutional Limitations of

Automobile Searches, 3 U.C.L.A.L. REV. 95 (1970); Note, Chambers v. Maroney: New
Dimensions in the law of search and seizure, 46 IND. L.J. 257 (1971); Annot. Validity,
Under Federal Constitution, of Warrantless Search of Automobile - Supreme Court
Cases, 26 L.Ed.2d 893 (1971); and Annot., 48 A.L.R.2d 537 (1973).
83. 392 U.S. at 9 (citations omitted). See also Note, From Private Placesto Personal
Privacy: A Post-Katz Study of Fourth Amendment Protection, 43 N.Y.U.L. REV. 968
(1968).
84. 510 P.2d 793 (Alaska 1973).
85. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
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tions or mental attitudes is extremely difficult if not impossible, in
most cases. 86 Justice Rabinowitz favored the test adopted by the
California Supreme Court in People v. Edwards. 7 California focuses
on whether the person has exhibited a reasonable expectation of privacy and, if so, whether that expectation
has been violated by unreason88
able governmental intrusion.
The Alaska court has applied Harlan's two-pronged reasonableness test in several cases. In Nathanson v. State, 89 the court held that
the appellant, a crab fisherman, did not have a reasonable expectation
of privacy in crab pots which he had placed in the ocean. 90 Consequently, state agents were free to inspect the pots without a search
warrant.91 Nathanson, however, does not specify which of the dual
requirements of the test was not satisfied, noting only ". . . that
fishermen . . . could not harbor an actual (subjective) expectation of
privacy in conducting a crabbing operation in the waters of the state, at
least not one that society is prepared to recognize as reasonable.''92
Nathanson was distinguished in the recent opinion in Woods and
Rohde, Inc. v. State .93 Woods held that administrative searches conducted by the State Department of Labor to detect possible safety code
violations by businesses were governed by the proscription against
unreasonable searches and seizures found in the state constitution.
Noting that the Alaska constitution contains an even broader guarantee
against unreasonable searches and seizures than is found in its federal
counterpart, the court held that the constitutional protection appertains
to commercial and business premises. Thus, in accordance with the
two-pronged test of Smith, the court found that the businesses may
entertain subjective expectations of privacy in their premises and, most
importantly, that such expectations of privacy are reasonable. Nathanson was distinguished on the grounds that because Alaska's fisheries
are a highly regulated and licensed industry, there is a lesser expectation of privacy present than is the case in ordinary businesses. Thus, in
Alaska warrantless searches may not be conducted of business premises; Nathanson may be best read to create a limited exception to this
rule in instances of highly regulated, controlled and licensed industries
critical to the welfare of the state.
86. Id. at 801.
87. 71 Cal.2d 1096, 458 P.2d 713 (1969).
88. Id.at 1098, 458 P.2d at 715.
89. 554 P.2d 456 (Alaska 1976).
90. Id.
91. Nathanson is loosely based on the "open field" doctrine test in which items left
in an open field, accessible to the public, are deemed to lack any reasonable expectation
of privacy. The open field doctrine and the plain view doctrine overlap analytically in
that while the plain view doctrine requires that the police officer lawfully be in a place
from which observations are made, the lawfulness of the officer's position is presumed
in "open field" cases.
92. Id. See also Klockenbrink v. State, 472 P.2d 958 (Alaska 1970).
93. 565 P.2d 138 (Alaska 1977).
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In Anderson v. State,94 the supreme court held that the appellant
had retained a reasonable expectation of privacy in photographic slides
stored on a shelf in his home. The court found that Anderson had
exhibited an actual, subjective expectation of privacy. The court further found that by virtue of the protection of the fourth amendment, and
95
by virtue of Alaska's right to privacy found in the state constitution,
the expectation of privacy retained in photographic
slides stored on a
96
shelf in one's home was inherently reasonable.
The most troublesome of the expectation of privacy cases is Smith
v. State .97 In Smith state troopers had manned a stakeout of the
appellant's apartment house and garbage dumpster. Over twelve days,
troopers periodically removed garbage placed in the dumpster by the
defendant. On the basis of evidence taken from the dumpster, a search
warrant was subsequently issued, and a number of drug related items
were found in Smith's apartment. On appeal, the majority of the
Alaska Supreme Court concluded that the appellant had not retained a
reasonable expectation of privacy in the garbage dumpster. 98 Applying
a "core factors" test, 99 the court distinguished between the privacy
expectation in the dumpster, which was used by the residents of the
appellant's apartment building, and the privacy expectation in trash
located close to a single family dwelling. Additionally, the court
opined that because municipal pickups were made from the dumpster,
tenants could be sure that periodically a group of third persons would
look into the dumpster and possibly scavenge items therefrom. io0
In a strong dissenting opinion, Justice Rabinowitz rejected the
view adopted by the majority. Finding little utility in the majority's
core factors test, he criticized the majority's incorporation of traditional property law concepts such as abandonment and relinquishment of
title into the realm of constitutional analysis. Justice Rabinowitz advanced a theory of "differential expectations of privacy," recognizing
that citizens might expect a few, infrequent invasions of their privacy
by third persons, but might simultaneously expect their privacy to
remain immune from governmental intrusion. 101
What the supreme court ignored in Smith is that a test focusing on
reasonableness of the expectation of privacy is largely unrealistic in the
context of garbage because by ordinance, citizens are required to
94. 555 P.2d 251 (Alaska 1976).
95. ALASKA CONST. art. I, § 22.
96. 555 P.2d at 257.
97.
98.

510 P.2d 793 (Alaska 1973).
Id. at 797.

99. Among the factors considered, were: Where the trash was located, whether the
dwelling was multiple or single unit, who removed the trash, and where the search of the
trash took place.

100. 510 P.2d at 798 (Alaska 1973).
101.

Id. at 803.
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dispose of their garbage in a prescribed manner. The garbage which
the appellant in Smith had indirectly deposited in the dumpster was
unlike common litter in that it had not been merely cast aside in public
by the appellant. Rather, the material had been simply deposited in the
trash facilities as required by law and by custom. After reading the
Smith case, one wonders how any resident of a multi-unit dwelling
could preserve any privacy in his garbage short of storing all of his
garbage in his apartment.
II. SEARCHES WITH WARRANTS
In the first part of this article, the three situations in which
governmental seizures are not governed by the requirements of the
fourth amendment were discussed. With those exceptions, all other
searches and seizures must conform with the reasonableness requirements of the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution and
Article I, section 14 of the Alaska Constitution.
The fourth amendment preserves the right of citizens to ".
be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, . .1."12 Section 14 of Article I of
the Alaska Constitution provides similar protection, adding the right of
citizens to be secure in their property as well.' 0 3 In Erickson v.
State,"° the Alaska Supreme Court recognized the broad protection
afforded by the fourth amendment, saying: "The warrant requirement
is not limited to dwelling houses. Neither the language of the fourth
amendment, nor any case construing it which we have found, suggests
0 5
that warrants are required for 'houses', but not for 'effects'."
In accordance with Katz v. United States, 106 which was adopted
by the Alaska court in Smith v. State,10 7 the protection of the fourth
amendment extends to all areas where there is a reasonable expectation of privacy.
Both the federal and Alaska constitutions protect citizens from
unreasonable searches and seizures. As will be demonstrated in the
following discussion, the Alaska court has pursued a policy of favoring
searches with warrants."0 8 The record of the Alaska Supreme Court's
search and seizure opinions provides a stark reflection of the implementation of this policy. The court, in its fifty-two search and
seizure opinions since statehood, has never invalidated a search warrant. While some of these cases exhibit a bold result orientation' °9 of
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.

See note 2 supra.
See note 2 supra.
507 P.2d 508 (Alaska 1973).
Id. at 519.
389 U.S. 347 (1967).
510 P.2d 793 (Alaska 1973).
Keller v. State, 543 P.2d 1211 (Alaska 1975).
See, e.g., Martel v. State, 511 P.2d 1055 (Alaska 1973).
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upholding searches with warrants, the supreme court has candidly
stated its policy of favoring
resolution of marginal cases in favor of
110
upholding the warrants.
As will be discussed in Part IV, not all warrantless searches are
unreasonable; several doctrines create exceptions to the warrant requirement. However, warrantless searches are unreasonable per se and
the burden of proving their validity falls upon the state."'
In accordance with the rules applied in the Federal courts, Alaska
appellate review of the issuance and sufficiency of a search warrant
is limited to the facts and information available to the magistrate.
Moreover, on appeal, great deference is given to the findings of the
magistrate. 112
Both the state and federal constitutions require that warrants for
search and for arrest be issued only upon a showing of probable
cause." 3 In Keller v. State," 4 the Alaska Supreme Court adopted the
definition of probable cause articulated by the United States Supreme
Court in Berger v. New York, 115 stating: "Probable cause under the
fourth amendment exists if the facts and circumstances within the
affiant's knowledge, and of which he has reasonably trustworthy
information, are sufficient unto themselves to warrant a man of reasonable caution to conclude that an offense has been or is being
committed."'6
Most of the cases involving searches or seizures with warrants in
Alaska fall into one of two groups. In the first group are cases which
have analyzed the sufficiency of an affidavit in support of the search
warrant and other facts and information available to the magistrate
upon its issuance. 7 In the second group are cases which have analyzed the sufficiency of a particular warrant to justify and validate the
search of a particular area or the seizure of a particular object." 8 A
third group of cases involves problems of enforcing valid warrants.
110. Keller v. State, 543 P.2d 1211 (Alaska 1975).
Ill. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, (1967); Erickson v. State, 507 P.22 (Alaska
1973).
112. See Keller v. State, 543 P.2d 1211 (Alaska 1975).
113. U.S. CONST. amend. IV; ALASKA CONST. art. I, § 4. See also Armentano, The
Standards for Probable Cause Under the Fourth Amendment, 44 CONN. BAR J. 137
(1970); Comment, Constitutional Requirements for Authority to Issue Warrants, WASH.
L.Q. 777 (1972).
114. 543 P.2d 1211 (Alaska 1975).
115. 388 U.S. 41 (1967).
116. Id. at 55.
117. Kristich v. State, 550 P.2d 796 (Alaska 1976); Keller v. State, 543 P.2d 1211
(Alaska 1975), Eliason v. State, 511 P.2d 1066 (Alaska 1973); Davenport v. State, 510
P.2d 78 (Alaska 1973, Jackson v. State, 509 P.2d 278 (Alaska 1973).
118. Anderson v. State, 555 P.2d 251 (Alaska 1976); Davis v. State, 499 P.2d 1025
(Alaska 1972); Bell v. State, 482 P.2d 854 (Alaska 1971).
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A.

Affidavit Sufficiency
To determine whether an affidavit in support of a search warrant
is sufficient to sustain the issuance of the warrant, the Alaska Supreme
Court has held that on appeal, the affidavit must be examined "com9 In State v.
mon sensically, as a whole." 11
Davenport, 20 the supreme
court rejected any requirement that each assertion of fact contained in
an affidavit must be traced to its ultimate source.
As indicated above, the affidavit must establish probable cause to
sustain the issuance of a warrant. In Martel v. State, 121 the supreme
court held that once probable cause has been established for a search of
a house and a warrant is issued, the probable cause can be properly
extended to the garage. While the Martel case turned, in part, on its
particular facts, the willingness of the supreme court to extend the
establishment of probable cause to a nearby garage reflects the court's
basic policy that searches with warrants are preferable and, generally,
should be sustained.
Insertion of erroneous information in an affidavit for a search
warrant will not automatically invalidate the warrant. In Davenport v.
State 122 the court held that a misstatement of fact contained in the
affidavit will not invalidate the warrant if, when the misstatement is
discarded, the remaining facts will support the issuance of the warrant. 123
1
The propriety of using reputation evidence in an affidavit for a
search warrant has not been fully considered by the Alaska Supreme
Court. Reputation evidence in such cases usually consists of an assertion by the affiant that the suspect is a "known gambler" or "a known
drug dealer." The United States Supreme Court addressed the problems raised by the use of reputation evidence in an affidavit in support
of a search warrant in two cases, Spinelli v. United States 124 and
United States v. Harris.1 25 Spinelli stated that reputation evidence
involving assertions that the defendant was a known associate of gamblers was "a bald and unilluminating assertion of suspicion that is
entitled to no weight in appraising the magistrate's decision."' 26 Subsequently in Harris, the court retreated from this view, holding that a
police officer's knowledge of a suspect's reputation was a "practicable
consideration of every day life" upon which a magistrate may properly
rely. 127
119. Keller v. State, 543 P.2d 1211 (Alaska 1975).
120. 510 P.2d 78 (Alaska 1973).
121. 511 P.2d 1055 (Alaska 1973).
122. 515 P.2d 377 (Alaska 1973).
123. Id. at 380. See Kipperman, Inaccurate Search Warrant Affidavits as a Ground
for Suppressing Evidence, 84 HARV. L. REV. 825 (1971).
124. 393 U.S. 410 (1969).
125. 403 U.S. 573 (1971).
126. 393 U.S. 410 (1969).
127. 403 U.S. 573 (1971).
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In Alaska, the use of reputation evidence was considered in
Kristich v. State.' 28 In that case, the Alaska Supreme Court justified
the use of certain kinds of reputation evidence on the grounds that the
information contained in the affidavit was considerably more substantial than the "mere assertion" referred to in Spinelli. In Kristich, the
assertion in the affidavit that the defendant was known as a gambler
and as an associate of gamblers was based on an extensive period of
surveillance, the detailing of the records of conviction for gambling of
the defendant's associates, and the defendant's prior convictions for
gambling. Thus, the propriety of the use of "merely assertive" reputation evidence in an affidavit for a search warrant remains open in
Alaska. 129
The use of hearsay information obtained from an unidentified
informant in an affidavit for a search warrant has posed recurring
problems for the Alaska Supreme Court. The use of such hearsay
information is permissible under certain conditions set out in a line of
Alaska cases derived, in large measure, from the prevailing federal
law. The identity of a hearsay informant need not be provided in an
affidavit for a search warrant, 130 even though identification of the
informant is one means of establishing the reliability of the informant. 131
Generally, the use of hearsay information is permissible if there is
a substantial basis for crediting it. In Alaska, the use of hearsay
evidence in an affidavit is permissible if it is "reasonably trustworthy."1 3 2 The trustworthiness of hearsay information in an affidavit is
measured by a two-pronged test borrowed by the Alaska Supreme
Court from the United States Supreme Court decision in Aguilar v.
Texas. 133 Aguilar sets out two requirements necessary to establish the
trustworthiness of hearsay information. First, the affidavit must contain sufficient underlying facts and circumstances which can reasonably support an inference of personal knowledge of the facts asserted
on the part of the informant. Second, the affidavit must contain facts
and circumstances which establish the reliability and credibility of the
hearsay informant. 34 The two-pronged test of Aguilar has been adopt128. 550 P.2d 796 (Alaska 1976).
129. See Note, The Use of Reputation in Establishing Probable Cause for Arrest and
Search, 1%9 WASH. L.Q. 339.
130. McCray v. Illinois, 386 U.S. 300 (1967); Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108 (1964);
Harrelson v. State, 516 P.2d 390 (Alaska 1973).
131. Davis v. State, 525 P.2d 541 (Alaska 1974); Davenport v. State, 514 P.2d 1159
(Alaska 1973); Eliason v. State, 511 P.2d 1066 (Alaska 1973). See also Pendergrast v.
United States, 416 F.2d 776, cert. denied, 396 U.S. 926 (1969).
132. Keller v. State, 543 P.2d 1211 (Alaska 1975); State v. Davenport, 510 P.2d 778
(Alaska 1973); Jackson v. State, 509 P.2d 278 (Alaska 1973); Erickson v. State, 507 P.2d
508 (Alaska 1973).
133. 378 U.S. 108 (1964).
134. Id. at 114.
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ed in three Alaska cases' 35 and is construed in Alaska in a manner
which provides prosecutors with several means by which personal
knowledge on the part of the informant and the trustworthiness of the
informant may be established.
Personal knowledge on the part of the informant must be established by facts and circumstances sworn to in an affidavit. A conclusory statement alone is insufficient. Even without an allegation and
circumstances supporting an inference of personal knowledge on the
part of the informant, an affidavit based on hearsay information may
be sustained if the information is provided with sufficient specificity so
as to fairly support the inference of personal knowledge. Applying this
"personal knowledge" substitute adopted from Spinelli,136 the Alaska
Supreme Court in Keller v. State137 sustained the issuance of a search
warrant based on hearsay even though personal knowledge had not
been alleged, because the specificity of the information fairly supported an inference of personal knowledge. In Keller the informant's tip
described information concerning the defendant's travel plans to Alaska including an allegation that a suitcase would contain a large amount
of drugs. While the informant's tip was very detailed in describing the
appearance, travel connections, and baggage of the defendant, the
information was very vague and unspecific with respect to the type and
quantity of illegal drugs alleged to have been carried by the defendant.
The supreme court held that the specificity of the information in other
areas was sufficient to justify the inference of personal knowledge on
the part of the informant.138 This result, despite the absolute lack of
any knowledge on the part of the informant with respect to the critical
details of the offense, the drugs themselves, reflects the court's seemingly unwaivering policy that searches with warrants be sustained.
The second prong of the Aguilar test requires that the hearsay
information include facts and circumstances which establish the reliability and credibility of the hearsay informant. This portion of the test
was adopted by Alaska in four cases. 139 The Alaska Supreme Court has
established three means by which the credibility of an informant may
be established. First, the reliability of the informant may be established
by the inclusion, in the affidavit for the warrant, of facts which
corroborate the informant's information. I4 Second, the credibility of
135. Keller v. State, 543 P.2d 1211 (Alaska 1975); Davis v. State, 525 P.2d 541 (Alaska
1974); Harrelson v. State, 516 P.2d 390 (Alaska 1973).
136. Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410 (1969).
137. 543 P.2d 1211 (Alaska 1975).
138. Id. at 1220.
139. Davis v. State, 525 P.2d 541 (Alaska 1974); Harrelson v.State, 516 P.2d 390
(Alaska 1973); Davenport v. State, 515 P.2d 377 (Alaska 1973); Smith v. State, 510 P.2d
793 (Alaska 1973).
140. Davis v. State, 525 P.2d 541 (Alaska 1974); Harrelson v. State, 516 P.2d 390
(Alaska 1973); Eliason v. State, 511 P.2d 1066 (Alaska 1973); Morris v. State, 473 P.2d
603 (Alaska 1970).
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the informant may be established by allegations and evidence of his
past reliability."'4 Finally, reliability of the hearsay informant may be
established by providing
the identity of the informant in the affidavit
142
for the warrant.

While the supreme court has set out the requirements for an
affidavit in support of a search warrant, the cases in this area reflect a
strong bias on the part of the court towards upholding the issuance of a
warrant. Specifically, the supreme court has permitted an affidavit
establishing probable cause to search a house to extend to a nearby
garage, has tolerated misstatements of facts and erroneous information
in an affidavit, and has adopted fairly liberal rules regarding the use of
hearsay information in an affidavit for a search warrant.
B.

Warrant Sufficiency
The main problem that is present in most cases involving questions of whether a warrant is sufficient to justify a search of an area or
the seizure of an object involves the particularity requirement. Derived
from Berger v. New York

43

and Stanford v. Texas, 144 the particulari-

ty requirement demands that warrants specifically describe the areas to
be searched and the items to be seized. 14 5 In Bell v. State14 6 and State
v. Davenport,147 the Alaska Supreme Court quoted the United States
Supreme Court's opinion in Marron v. United States, 14 8 saying:
The requirement that warrants shall particularly describe the
things to be seized makes general searches under them impossible and prevents the seizure of one thing under a warrant describing another. As to what is to be taken, nothing is
to be left to the discretion of the officer executing the warrant. 149
Thus, items and areas not specified in the search warrant may not
be seized or searched. In Anderson v. State, 150 the supreme court
condemned a police officer's holding a photographic slide found in
defendant's apartment, to the light for scrutiny because he had exceeded the directives of a search warrant authorizing a search for
drugs. In Anderson, the court adopted the "immediately apparent"
141.
1973).

Davis v. State, 525 P.2d 541 (Alaska 1974); Smith v. State, 510 P.2d 793 (Alaska

142. Davis v. State, 525 P.2d 541 (Alaska 1974); Eliason v. State, 511 P.2d 1066
(Alaska 1973); See also Pendergrast v. United States, 416 F.2d 776, cert. denied, 396
U.S. 926 (1969).
143.

388 U.S. 41 (1967).

144. 379 U.S. 476 (1965).
145.

See Annot. II A.L.R.3d 1330 (1967).

146. 482 P.2d 854 (Alaska 1971).
147. 510 P.2d 78 (Alaska 1973).
148. 275 U.S. 192 (1927).

149. Id. at 195, 196,
150. 555 P.2d 251 (Alaska 1976).
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test of Coolidge v. New Hampshire. 51 The seizure of the slides was
invalid because it was not immediately apparent to the officers that the
slides constituted evidence of a crime until they exceeded the boundaries of the search warrant by holding the slides to the light.
There are, however, exceptions to the particularlity requirement.
In Davis v. State, 1" 2 the court upheld the seizure of an item that had
not been described in the search warrant but which the executing
officer had probable cause to believe was related to another crime
being committed in his presence. In State v. Davenport,153 it was held
that when an officer has probable cause to believe that objects which
he discovers in the course of a valid search conducted under a valid
warrant are the fruits of a particular crime, that officer may seize those
objects even though they are neither listed on the search warrant nor
related to the crime which served as the basis for the warrant. Probable
cause under these circumstances exists, the court stated, only because
the information the officer possesses immediately following discovery
is sufficient to warrant a reasonable man of reasonable caution to
believe that an offense has happened or is being committed. 54
Finally, in Bell v. State' 55 the supreme court stated that an officer
may seize evidence of a crime, even though such property is not
particularly described in the search warrant, when the objects discovered and seized are reasonably related to the offense in question,
when the officer has a reasonable basis for drawing a connection
between the observed objects and the crime which furnished the basis
for the search warrant, and when the discovery of such property is
made in the course of a good faith search conducted within the
authorized parameters of the search warrant. 156 Thus, the seizure of the
slides in Anderson failed to meet the requirements of Bell in that the
lifting of the slides to the light for scrutiny exceeded the parameters of
the search warrant for drugs.
Generally, areas and objects not specified in a warrant may not be
searched. Again, however, Martel v. State157 permitted the search of a
garage under a warrant specifying a search for the nearby house. While
Martel arguably rests on its facts, the court's willingness to stretch
existing law so as to permit the search of the garage again reflects the
policy of sustaining warranted searches.
C.

Warrant Enforcement
Several cases have involved problems of enforcement of a search
warrant. Alaska has never, for example, resolved questions involving
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.

403
525
510
Id.
482
156. Id.
157. 511

U.S. 443 (1971).
P.2d 541 (Alaska 1974).
P.2d 78 (Alaska 1973).
at 85.
P.2d 854 (Alaska 1971).
at 860.

P.2d 1055 (Alaska 1973).
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proper pre-search entry procedure for warrant enforcement. In Davis v.
State, 158 the court held that an affirmative refusal to admit law enforcement officers to a home could justify a forced entry. The court left
undetermined, however, whether the officers must announce their
presence and their purposes.
By statute in Alaska,' 59 a magistrate must designate whether a
warrant is to be executed by either day-time or twenty-four hour
service. In State v. Shelton, 160 the supreme court overlooked a technical failure to indicate the time of service and looked instead to the
circumstances surrounding the issuance of the warrant. Ironically, at a
subsequent evidentiary hearing in Shelton the magistrate could not
recall whether day-time or night-time service had been authorized,
which suggests that the supreme court was overreaching when it stated
resolved questions regarding the
that the surrounding circumstances
1
service of the warrant.16

State v. Layland 162 stated that a formal warrant, and not merely
an oral order of the court, is required to satisfy the warrant requirement. In Layland, a blood sample had been obtained from the defendant upon an oral order from a district court judge. The supreme court
order could not
relied upon the state's concession that such an oral
63
satisfy the formalities of the warrant requirement.
Finally, the supreme court has provided special procedures for the
issuance and enforcement of a warrant authorizing the seizure of first
amendment materials. Hanby v. State 64 held that with respect to
films and other first amendment materials sought to be seized by a
search warrant on obscenity grounds, the issuing magistrate must
either view the film or receive detailed and particularized evidence of
its obscenity before a valid search or seizure warrant may be issued.
III.

EXCEPTIONS TO THE WARRANT REQUIREMENT

As discussed above, the fourth amendment only requires reasonable searches and seizures. While a properly issued search warrant
is not an absolute requirement under the fourth amendment, a search
or seizure without a warrant is per se unreasonable. I65 Once a search
158. 525 P.2d 541 (Alaska 1974). See also Note, The Inventory Search of an Offender

Arrestedfor a MinorTraffic Violation: Its Scope and ConstitutionalRequirements, 53 B.
U.S. REV. 858 (1973); Annot. 48 A.L.R.2d 537 (1973).
159. Alaska R. Gim. P. 37(a)(3)(iv) provides, in part: "A warrant . . . shall direct

that it be served between 7AM and 10PM, but if an affiant is positive that the property is
on the person or in the place to be searched, a warrant may direct that it be served at any
time." See also Annot. 26 A.L.R.2d 951 (1969).
160. 554 P.2d 404 (Alaska 1976).
161. Queare the significance in Alaska, the land of the midnight sun, of requiring
indication of daytime or nighttime service of a search warrant.
162. 535 P.2d 1043 (Alaska 1975).
163. Id. at 1046.

164. 479 P.2d 486 (Alaska 1970).
165. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967); Erickson v. State, 507 P.2d 508
(Alaska 1973).
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or a seizure has been executed without a warrant, the burden falls upon
the state to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that one of the
exceptions' 66 to the warrant requirement applies and will sustain the
search as reasonable. 167 This section will discuss the several exceptions to the warrant requirement, which include inventory searches,
consent searches, stop and frisk, searches incident to arrest, and
exigency searches such as searches following "hot pursuit," emergency searches, and searches based on the mobility of the object to be
searched. Both the Alaska and the United States Supreme Courts have
recognized that exceptions to the warrant requirement are to be narrowly construed and carefully drawn.
A.

Inventory Searches
An inventory search involves a search of an arrestee's
person or belongings prior to or concurrent with his incarceration. The
Alaska Supreme Court has not yet directly resolved the propriety of
inventory searches. Outside Alaska, there is a split of authority regarding whether a warrantless search of an arrestee's possessions may be
conducted when he is incarcerated. Notably, the United States Supreme Court has held in UnitedStates v. Robinson' 68 and Gustafson v.
Florida169 that "an individual lawfully subjected to a custodial arrest
retains no significant Fourth Amendment interest in the privacy of his
person." 7 ° Thus, under Robinson and Gustafson police officers are
free to perform a full scale and seemingly unlimited search of an
incarcerated suspect without a warrant regardless of the grounds for his
arrest. Several state supreme courts have held otherwise, however, and
prior to Robinson the general rule in most jurisdictions was that a
search of the arrestee's person had
to be reasonably related to the
171
offense for which he was arrested.
Inventory searches should not be confused with searches incident
to arrest. An officer is permitted to conduct a warrantless search of the
person of an arrestee and of the area within the arrestee's immediate
control. This search is generally limited in scope to one designed to
reveal weapons which might be used to harm the officer and for
evidence of the crime for which the person has been arrested. Inventory searches, which generally occur at the jail prior to incarceration,
166. The exceptions to the warrant requirement are frequently described as being
narrowly defined." The accuracy of this description is questionable when, as in
Nathanson v. State, 554 P.2d 456 (Alaska 1976), crabpots submergedfathoms below the

sea are described as within plain view.
167. Lego v. Twomey, 404 U.S. 477 (1973); United States v. Marshall, 488 F.2d 1169
(9th Cir. 1973); Schraff v. State, 544 P.2d 834 (Alaska 1975).
168. United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218 (1973).
169. 414 U.S. 260 (1973).
170. Id. at 266.
171. See, e.g., State v. Kaluna, 520 P.2d 51, 56 (Hawaii 1974) and the cases and
authority cited therein.
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are not so limited. The espoused purposes of inventory searches are to
prevent breaks in the chain of custody of evidence, to protect the state
against claims of theft or loss of inmates' personal effects, and to keep
the prison secure from contraband materials.
While the Alaska Supreme Court has not squarely resolved the
propriety of inventory searches, the problem has arisen in several
cases. Daygee v. State 72 left the issue undecided, and the court
cautioned that "[niothing herein should be taken to indicate the validity of inventory searches which appear to be clearly outside exigency
rules.' ' 73 In Schraff v. State, 174 Justice Conner, in dicta in a majority
opinion, included a reference to inventory searches in a list of search
warrant exceptions applied by other courts. The court refrained, however, from specifically adopting, rejecting, or commenting on the
17
exception. 1
Dicta in other Alaska cases is even less illuminating. In Lemon v.
State ,176 police officers arrested the defendant; when they placed him
in incarceration, they seized his clothes and subjected them to laboratory analysis. The warrantless search and seizure was sustained by the
supreme court as incident to the defendant's arrest. 177 The court stated,
however, that:
A different issue would be presented if the seizure and
search of the clothes had occurred at such an interval after
incarceration as to render it not incident to the arrest or if the
clothing had been merely taken as "inventory"
7 of the prisoner and a later decision was made to search. 1
The court favorably cited Brett v. United States179 in which the Fifth
Circuit Court of Appeals reversed an inventory search of a prisoner's
clothing which occurred three days after his arrest.
Peter v. State 80 suggested, however, that the mere removal of
effects and clothing from an arrestee, and the inventorying of them, is
proper. Thus, it would seem fair to state that at the present time in
Alaska, upon arrest and incarceration, police officers may take the
arrestee's possessions and inventory them. But there is nothing in
Alaska law which suggests that upon arrest a person sacrifices and
relinquishes all of his fourth amendment rights and protection in
accordance with Robinson and Gustafson. 181 Moreover, Justice Er172. 514 P.2d 1159 (Alaska 1973).
173. Id. at 1165 n.13.
174. 544 P.2d 834 (Alaska 1975).
175. Id. at 841.
176. 514 P.2d 1141 (Alaska 1973).
177. Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23 (1963); McCoy v State, 491 P.2d 127 (Alaska
1971); Ellison v. State, 383 P.2d 220 (Alaska 1964).
178. 514 P.2d 1151, 1158n.15 (Alaska 1973).
179. 412 F.2d 401 (5th Cir. 1969).
180. 531 P.2d 1263 (Alaska 1975).
181. As discussed in the introduction of this article, the Alaska Supreme Court has
stated on several occasions that in construing the state constitution it is not limited by the
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win's statement in Daygee cautioning that nothing in that opinion was
to be taken to support the validity of an inventory search is, arguably,
indicative of the unfavorable view likely to be taken by the Alaska
court towards this exception.
Any ambiguity regarding the propriety of inventory searches in
Alaska may be resolved by the presently pending case of Zehrung v.
State. 82 That case, which involves the inventory search of the possessions of a person arrested on a minor misdemeanor charge, raises all
the questions mentioned herein concerning the rights of an arrestee and
the authority of the state to search his possessions without a warrant
upon his arrest and incarceration.
Consent Searches
Police officers may execute a search or seizure without a warrant
if a person with the requisite authority tenders a valid and voluntary
consent to a search.1 83 In Sleziak v. State,' 184 the Alaska Supreme
Court required that consent to a search and seizure be proven by "clear
and positive evidence." Both Sleziak and the case from which it was
derived, United States v. Smith,185 require that consent to a search not
be a product of duress or coercion, actual or implicit. To be voluntary,
the consent must be unequivocal, specific, and intelligently given.' 8 6
B.

Like other constitutional rights, a defendant may not be compelled to waive his fourth amendment right to be free from unreasonable
searches and seizures. In Bargas v. State, 87 the defendant refused to
consent to a warrantless search of his person. The Alaska Supreme
Court held that it was error for the state prosecutor to comment on the
defendant's refusal to consent to the search. The court analogized the
prosecutor's comment on the defendant's exercise of his fourth amendment rights to a prosecutor's comment on a defendant's exercise of his
fifth amendment rights in declining to testify, a practice which the
United States Supreme Court condemned in Griffin v. California.88
Sleziak held that a defendant need not be warned of his right not
to consent to a search. But in Sleziak the defendant had been given a
warning of his Miranda rights. The Alaska court specifically reserved
construction afforded similar provisions in the federal constitution by the United States
Supreme Court. Federal cases construing similar constitutional provisions are viewed as
establishing the minimal constitutional requirements. The Alaska court is free, then, to
construe the state constitution in a broader fashion. See, e.g., Smith v. State, 510 P.2d
793 (Alaska 1973); Baker v. City of Fairbanks, 471 P.2d 386 (Alaska 1970).
182. Appeal No. 2823 (1977), decision pending. See post-script at 121 infra.
183. Schraff v. State, 544 P.2d 834 (Alaska 1975).
184. 454 P.2d 252 (Alaska 1969).
185. 308 F.2d 657 (2nd Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 906 (1963).
186. Sleziak v. State, 454 P.2d 262 (Alaska 1969).
187. 489 P.2d 130 (Alaska 1971).
188. 380 U.S. 609 (1965).
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ruling on the necessity to inform a defendant of his right to refuse to
consent to a search in instances in which a Miranda warning has not been
given. 189

Cases involving the consent exception to the search warrant
requirement fall into two categories. In the first group are cases in
which the alleged consent was tendered by the defendant himself. In
the second category are cases in which the consent was tendered by a
third party. Sleziak was the first Alaska case raising an issue involving
a defendant's consent. The Sleziak court, citing United States v.
Smith, 9 ° found that the defendant had tendered a valid and voluntary
consent to a search of his home which produced a suspect gun.191
Two other cases have involved consents tendered by defendants.
Rubey v. State'92 held that a valid and voluntary consent had not been
tendered by a defendant who had been told by police officers that she
had to give up certain money for which they were looking. The court
cited its prior opinion in Brown v. State, 193 saying that since there was
not a voluntary surrender, the search was governed by the requirements of the fourth amendment. In Layland v. State, 194 the defendant, charged with operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated, had
declined to consent to the taking of a blood sample by police officers.
The Alaska Supreme Court held that while consent to the taking of a
blood sample was one means by which the state may obtain such
evidence, in light of the fact that the defendant had not tendered a
consent, the search would have to be sustained on other grounds or be
held violative of fourth amendment rights. 195 The court left unresolved the issue of whether an unconscious person could be deemed to
impliedly consent to such a search.1 96
Similarly, three cases involved problems raised by consents tendered by third parties. Ferguson v. State'97 left open the question of
whether reliance by police officers on the consent to a search of one
who had "apparent authority" to give such consent could validate a
warrantless search, notwithstanding the actual lack of authority retained by that person.
Ferguson involved the search of a garage upon the consent
tendered by a person who held a lien on the property. The Alaska
189. 454 P.2d at 259-60.

190. 308 F.2d 657 (2nd Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 906 (1963).
191.

In Sleziak the defendant was under questioning by police officers in connection

with the killing of his employees. Police officers testified that Sleziak admitted to owning
a gun during the questioning. It was alleged that Sleziak consented to having a police

officer go to his home to retrieve the weapon. Sleziak denied the truth of the officer's
testimony and asserted that he did not consent.
192. 456 P.2d 470 (Alaska 1969).
193. 372 P.2d 785 (Alaska 1962).

194.
195.
196.
197.

535 P.2d 1043 (Alaska 1975).
Id. at 1045.
Id. at 1046.
488 P.2d 1032 (Alaska 1971).
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Supreme Court held that such a consent, alone, does not meet constitutional requirements. The Supreme Court aligned itself with Chapman
v. United States, 198 which invalidated the consent of a landlord to
entry by police into the defendant's house, and Stoner v. California,199
in which the consent of a night clerk to a search of the defendant's
hotel room for evidence of armed robbery was similarly held invalid.
Quoting Chapman, the court said: "[T]o uphold such an entry, search
and seizure 'without a warrant would reduce the [Fourth] Amendment
to a nullity and leave [tenants'] homes secure only on the discretion of
[landlords].' "200 Ferguson's recognition of the parity of tenants'
rights and the rights of those who live in multi-unit dwellings, with
those of home owners is curious in view of the majority opinion in
Smith v. State concerning the reasonableness of tenants' expectations
of privacy in their garbage dumpsters. 20 1
In Erickson v. State, 202 the court found that a neighbor who had
brought a suitcase of the defendant's to the police station did not have
authority to tender a valid consent to the search of the suitcase. Finally,
in Christian v. State,2"3 the court arguably held that the registered
owner of a vehicle could consent to a search of the vehicle. At a
minimum, the court held that police officers could rely on such a
consent, notwithstanding the actual lack of ownership of the vehicle at
the time the consent was tendered. 204 Thus, while Christian reflects
the court's view that police officers do not act unreasonably in relying
on the consent of the non-owner whose name appears on the registration, the court ignored problems of good faith and collusion in such
situations. Unresolved and not analyzed in Christian are questions
involving instances in which the registered owner knows that he does
not actually own the vehicle, and, more seriously, instances in which
police officers may have reason to believe that the person whose name
appears on the registration does not actually own the vehicle. 20 5
198. 365 U.S. 610, (1961).
199. 376 U.S. 483, reh. denied, 377 U.S. 940 (1964).
200. 488 P.2d 1032, 1035 (Alaska 1971) (quoting 365 U.S. 610, 616, (1961)).
201. 510 P.2d 793 (Alaska 1973).
202. 507 P.2d 508 (Alaska 1973).
203. 513 P.2d 664 (Alaska 1973).
204. Id. at 668.
205. J.M.A. v. State, 542 P.2d 170 (Alaska 1975) could also have been viewed as a
third party consent case. Instead, the court sustained the search of the defendant's room
and personal effects by his foster parent on the grounds that the intrusion constituted a
search by a private person, not governed by the requirements of the Fourth Amendment,

(See Part I supra). For further discussion of third party consent, see Consent Searches:
An Alternative Analysis, 41 UNIv. OF CHic. L. REv. 121 (1973); Comment, Third Party
Consent to Search and Seizure: A Reexamination, 20 J. PUB. L. 313 (1971); Note, Third
Party Consent to Search and Seizure, (1967) WASH. U.L.Q. 12; Note, Third Party
Consent to Search and Seizure, 33 UNIV. OF CHIc. L. REV. 797 (1966); Annot. 31
A.L.R.2d 1078 (1953).
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C.

Stop and Frisk
The doctrine of "stop and frisk" represents one area of search
and seizure law in which the Alaska Supreme Court has declined to
follow the lead of the federal courts. 2°6 Under federal stop and frisk
doctrine, police officers are permitted in certain circumstances, to
briefly detain a suspect and pat him down for weapons on less than the
quantum of probable cause required to justify a warrantless arrest or
search. The leading federal cases in this area are Terry v. Ohio20 7 and
its companion case, Sibron v. New York. °8 In Terry, the United
States Supreme Court rejected the argument that stops and frisks were
not intrusions of a sufficient magnitude to be governed by the fourth
amendment. Chief Justice Warren, writing for the court, stated:
The distinctions of classical "stop and frisk" theory thus
served to divert attention from the central inquiry under the
Fourth Amendment-the reasonableness and all the circumstances of the particular governmental invasion of a citizen's
personal security. "Search" and "seizure" are not talismans. We therefore reject the notions that the Fourth
Amendment does not come into play at all as a limitation
upon police conduct if the officers stop short of something
' 29
called a "technical arrest" or "full blown search. " 0
Although the supreme court held that stops and frisks were subject to
the reasonableness requirement of the fourth amendment, the court
also recognized that application of a reasonableness test was, inherently, a balancing process. Citing Camara v. Municipal Court,21 °
Chief Justice Warren said:
In order to assess the reasonableness of [the officer's] conduct as a general proposition, it is necessary "first to focus
upon the governmental interest which allegedly justifies official intrusion upon the constitutionally protected interests of
the private citizen," for there is "no ready test for determining reasonableness other than by balancing the need to
search [or seize]
against the invasion which the search [or
21
seizure] entails. 1
Applying this balancing test in cases involving a stop and frisk, the
supreme court held that such intrusions were permissible on less than
probable cause. However, the court required that in justifying the
particular intrusion the police officer must be able to point to specific
and articulable facts which, with rational inferences from those facts,
reasonably warrant that intrusion.21 2
206. Coleman v. State, 553 P.2d 40 (Alaska 1976).
207. 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
208. 392 U.S. 40 (1%8).
209. 392 U.S. 1, 19 (1968).
210. 387 U.S. 523 (1967).
211. Id. at 534-35.
212. See Cook, The Art of Frisking, 40 FORD. L. REv. 789 (1972); LaFave, "Street
Encounters" and the Constitution: Terry, Sibron, Peters and Beyond, 67 MICH. L. REV.
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Alaska has never fully adopted the United States Supreme Court's
stop and frisk position. Indeed, until fairly recently it was unclear what
authority police officers in Alaska had to make stops or frisks on less
than probable cause.
Two pre- Terry Alaska cases permitted stops, questioning, and
frisks of suspects under "suspicious circumstances." In Goss v.
State," 3 a police officer observed a car drive away from the side of the
building where a business was located and proceed for about a half a
block with its headlights off. The officer followed the car and after it
had turned around and headed in the opposite direction the officer
stopped it. The court concluded that the officer was within his lawful
authority to make the stop, that the officer had done nothing more than
conduct an investigation in response to circumstances that aroused his
suspicions.2 14 Then in Maze v. State, 215 a police officer observed a
person standing on a windowsill and holding on to the top of a metal
grill on the window of a loan company. The officer shined his flashlight on the suspect, who alighted and walked toward a restaurant. As
the defendant neared the entrance of the club, the officer shouted and
ran after him. The officer grabbed the suspect and interrogated him.
Noting that the window of the loan company office was broken, the
officer then arrested the defendant. The supreme court stated that cause
existed for the stop and for the arrest, stating: "In Goss v. State we
held that police officers have the right to stop and question a person
under suspicious circumstances, and21if6 probable cause is then found to
exist, the person may be arrested."
Thus, in the two Alaska stop and frisk cases which preceeded Terry
v. Ohio ,217 the supreme court permitted intrusions without articulating any
standards of reasonableness. Subsequently, Terry and Sibron established
the federal constitutional minimal requirements for stops and frisks on less
than probable cause, requiring articulable facts and circumstances that
criminal activity is afoot to justify the stop and additional articulable facts
and circumstances that the2 18suspect is armed or dangerous to justify the
protective pat-down frisk.
The Alaska Supreme Court first indicated its reluctance to adopt
the Terry-Sibron approach to stop and frisk in a case in which that
39 (1968); Comment, Stop and Frisk: Invasion of Privacy Without Probable Cause, 4
UNIV. OF SAN FRAN. L. REV. 284 (1970); Note, The Limits of Stop and Frisk - Questions
Unanswered by Terry, 10 Ariz. L. Rev. 419 (1968); and Note, Stop and Frisk: A
Perspective, 53 CORNELL L. REV. 899 (1968).
213. 390 P.2d 220 (Alaska), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 859 (1964).
214. Id. at 224.
215. 425 P.2d 235 (Alaska 1967).
216. Id. at 238 (footnote omitted). The reasoning of Goss and Maze was grounded in
Article 1, section 14 of the Alaska Constitution.
217. 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
218. 392 U.S. 40, 64 (1967).
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doctrine was hardly at issue. In Mattern v. State, 2 19 the majority
correctly noted that the doctrine of stop and frisk was tangential to the
resolution of the search and seizure issue presented in that case. Because
Justice Erwin, in his concurring opinion, was of the view that the
search comported with the requirement of Terry,220 the majority, in a
footnote, not only expressed its anticipated disdain for Terry, but
retreated from the rather openended approach of Goss as well. Justice
Conner wrote:
There is language in our opinion in Goss v. State which
approves of the stop and frisk practice. However, we note
that, unlike many jurisdictions which allow this practice,
Alaska does not have a statute authorizing the police to
forcibly stop a citizen on less probable cause to arrest. It
should also be noted that several members of the United
States Supreme Court have begun to reevaluate the Terry
opinion. In a recent opinion Justice Brennan expressed the
same concern of Judge Friendly that, unless it held in check,
there is a danger that "Terry will have opened the sluicegates
for serious and unintended erosion of the protection of the
"'
Fourth Amendment." [citation omitted]22
Lemon v. State2 2 2 involved a warrantless search justified as incidental to an arrest. However, the court noted in Lemon that a search
incident to arrest, unlike a stop and frisk, could occur at the station
house and not be held to be too remote.223
Stop and frisk law in Alaska crystalized in last year's opinion in
Coleman v. State.224 In Coleman, police officers proceeded to the area
in which an armed robbery had been committed after receiving information that such a crime was in progress. Arriving at the scene less
than two minutes later, they observed a vehicle driven by a man
roughly matching the description received by the officers during the
initial dispatch. The Alaska Supreme Court permitted the stop and
search of Coleman's vehicle on less than probable cause, specifically
adopting not the majority opinion in Terry, but the limited view of
stop and frisk espoused by Justice Brennan and Judge Friendly in
Adams v. Williams. 225
Justice Erwin, for the majority, noted that the particular concern
expressed by Justice Brennan and Judge Friendly was that the doctrine
of stop and frisk should not be extended beyond situations requiring
immediate police response to protect the public in serious cases where
there is a likelihood of imminent danger about to occur or where
serious harm has recently been perpetrated to persons or property. 226
219.
220.
221.
222.
223.
224.
225.
226.

500 P.2d 228 (Alaska 1972).
Id. at 235.
Id. at 233 n. 15 (citations omitted).
514 P.2d 1141 (Alaska 1973).
Id. at 1157-58.
553 P.2d 40 (Alaska 1976).
407 U.S. 143, 153 (1972) (Marshall, J., dissenting opinion).
553 P.2d 40 (Alaska 1976).
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Said Justice Erwin, "While we agree with the view expressed by
Justice Brennan and Judge Friendly, their concern is not applicable in
227
the case at bar."

Presumably, the concern of Justice Brennan and Judge Friendly
was not applicable in Coleman because the case involved a recently
perpetrated serious harm to a person (rape-strong arm robbery) which
demanded an immediate response to protect the public. Thus, the
Alaska Supreme Court adopted a very limited view of stop and frisk.
The court said:
We do not believe that our rule permitting temporary detention for questioning in certain cases, i.e., cases where the
police officer has a reasonable suspicion that imminent public danger exists or serious harm to persons or property has
recently occurred, conflicts
with the Fourth Amendment or
22
the state constitution.

1

Thus, in Alaska, the police officer may make a stop and frisk on less
than probable cause only within a narrow range of situations where the
police officer has a reasonable suspicion that imminent public danger
exists or serious harm to persons or property has recently occurred.229
D.

Search Incident to Arrest

When incidental to a lawful arrest, a warrantless search may be made
of the arrestee and of the area within his immediate control. 230 The United
States Supreme Court developed the search incident to arrest exception
to the warrant requirement through a line of cases which include
Weeks v. United States 231Harris v. United States,232 UnitedStates v.
Rabinowitz ,233 Ker v. California,234 and Chimel v. United States. 235
In Alaska, a search incident to an arrest must be predicated on a
lawful arrest, and not a arrest that is a mere pretext to conduct the
search.236 In Schraff v. State, 237 the court held that an invalid arrest
227. Id. at 46.
228. Id.
229. Coleman v. State, 553 P.2d 40 (Alaska 1976).
230. Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23, (1963); Agnello v. United States, 269 U.S. 20,
(1925); and McCoy v. State, 491 P.2d 127 (Alaska 1971). See also, Cook, Warrantless
Searches Incident to Arrest, 24 ALA. L. REV. 2607 (1972); Note, Search and Seizure
Since Chimel, 55 MIN. L. REV. 1011 (1971); Comment, Permissible Search of Premises
Incidental to a Lawful Searches Incident to Arrest, 78 YALE L.J. 433 (1969); Note,
Searches of the Person Incident to Lawful Arrest, 69 COL. L. REV. 866 (1969); Recent
Development, Constitutional Law Search and Seizure - Limiting the Permissible Scope
of Search Incident to an Arrest, 15 VILL. L. REV. 242 (1969).
231. 230 U.S. 383 (1914).
232. 390 U.S. 234 (1968).
233. 339 U.S- 56 (1950).
234. 374 U.S. 23 (1963).
235. 295 U.S. 752 (1969).
236. McCoy v. State, 491 P.2d 197 (Alaska 1971).
237. 544 P.2d 834 (Alaska 1975).
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renders a subsequent search incident to that arrest invalid as well. And
in Bargas v. State ,238 the court held that a search could not be
sustained under this exception where no arrest of any type had been
made and no probable cause for arrest existed.
But under certain circumstances, a warrantless search may be
sustained as incident to an arrest even though the search is executed
before the arrest is made. In Goss v. State,2 39 the Alaska Supreme
Court held that a pre-arrest warrantless search is permissible if probable cause for the arrest exists prior to the search. Evidence derived
from the pre-arrest search may not, however, 24 be used to establish
probable cause for the arrest. The search incident to arrest doctrine is
not without exceptions and limitations. Questions involving limitations
on time between arrest and search, the scope of a search incident to an
arrest, and the permissible area of a search incident to an arrest have
been among those most frequently litigated in Alaska search and
seizure law.
There is no question that the person of an arrestee may be
searched incident to a valid arrest without a warrant. 24' Moreover,
Alaska has adopted the federal view that the search incident to an arrest
may also extend to the area within the immediate control of the
arrestee. 24 2 The delineation of the "area within the immediate control"
of the arrestee has been the subject of several opinions. Four cases
sustained the extension of a warrantless search incident to an arrest to
the automobile in which the arrestee had been riding. 243 The Alaska
Supreme Court, however, has expressed some reluctance to treat
houses as it has automobiles. Thus, in Spietz v. State,264 the court held
that a warrantless search of an arrestee incident to his arrest on the
porch of his house could not be extended into the house itself because
the interior of the house was not within the area of the arrestee's
control. In Fresneda v. State ,245 the extension of a search incident to an
arrest into another room of the house in which the arrestee was taken
into custody was condemned by the court. In Stevens v. State,2" the
238. 489 P.2d 130 (Alaska 1971).
239. 390 P.2d 220 (Alaska), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 859, (1964).
240. Id. at 234. Goss is based in part on Henry v. United States, 361 U.S. 98, (1959),
in which the United States Supreme Court held that an arrest made without probable
cause could not sustain a pre-arrest warrantless search.
241. Avery v. State, 514 P.2d 637 (Alaska 1973), McCoy v. State, 491 P.2d 127
(Alaska 1971); Rubey v. City of Fairbanks, 456 P.2d'470 (Alaska 1969); Maze v. State,
425 P.2d 235 (Alaska 1967); Goss v. State, 390 P.2d 220 (Alaska), cert denied, 379 U.S.
859, (1964).
242. See cases cited in note 223 supra.
243. Merrill v. State, 423 P.2d 687 (Alaska 1967); Goss v. State, 390 P.2d 220
(Alaska), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 859, (1964); Ellison v. State, 383 P.2d 716 (Alaska 1963);
Bell v. State, 482 P.2d 854 (Alaska 1971).
244. 531 P.2d 521 (Alaska 1975).
245.

458 P.2d 154 (Alaska 1969).

246. 443 P.2d 600 (Alaska 1968).
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court declined to sustain a similar search when the suspect was not
even in the house at the time it was searched. On the other hand in
Avery v. State,247 the extension of a search incident to an arrest into an
adjoining room of a house was permitted on the grounds that, under the
facts in that case, the possible danger posed by accomplices lurking in
the next room justified the intrusion.
With respect to proximity of time, Alaska only requires that the
search be "substantially contemporaneous" with arrest. 24 Both
McCoy v. State2 49 and Layland v. State25 ° unequivocally require that a
warrantless search be executed "substantially contemporaneous" with
an arrest to be sustained as incident to the arrest. While no specific
time limits have been established, the court has adopted a "facts and
circumstances" approach to the reasonableness of any delay between
arrest and search. 25 1 This approach follows the federal rule in this area.
The permissible scope of a search incident to an arrest has continued to be one of the more controversial points of Alaska search and
seizure law. To explain the nature of this controversy requires some
brief background. In United States v. Rabinowitz ,252 Justice Frankfurter in a dissent, limited the search incident to arrest exception to the
fulfillment of the two rationales which are its basis:
First, in order to protect the arresting officer and to deprive
the prisoner of potential means of escape.

. .

and, second-

ly, to avoid destruction of evidence by the arrested person. .

.

.From this it follows that officers may search and

seize not only the things physically on the person
253 arrested,
but those within his immediate physical control.
Justices Rabinowitz and Connor of the Alaska Supreme Court, have
consistently adopted Justice Frankfurter's position with respect to
searches incident to arrest. Specifically, Justice Rabinowitz, in his
dissent in McCoy v. State254 stated:

On the one hand, they (the two rationales) provide the
theoretical and practical justification for departure from the
constitutional requirement that searches be conducted pursuant to warrants. On the other hand, the same rationales
furnish appropriate criteria for delineation of the intensity of
a warrantless
search of the person incident to a lawful ar255
rest.

247. 514 P.2d 637 (Alaska 1973).
248. Layland v. State, 535 P.2d 1043 (Alaska 1975); McCoy v. State, 491 P.2d 127
(Alaska 1971).
249. 491 P.2d 127 (Alaska 1971).
250. 535 P.2d 1043 (Alaska 1975).
251. Id.
252. 339 U.S. 56 (1950).
253. Id. at 72.
254. 491 P.2d 127 (Alaska 1971).
255.

Id. at 141.
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Subsequent to United States v. Rabinowitz,256 however, the ma257
jority of the United States Supreme Court in Chimel v. California,
in setting limits upon the scope of a premises search incident to a
warrantless arrest, adopted Justice Frankfurter's analysis of the incidental search exception to the warrant requirement. Thus, Chimel
limited the extension of a premises search incident to an arrest to the
two rationales articulated by Justice Frankfurter in his dissent in
Rabinowitz: destruction of evidence and protection of the officer.
Application of Chimel is the source of the disagreement in Alaska
case law concerning the permissible scope of a search incident to
arrest. In McCoy v. State,258 for example, officers arrested the defendant for attempting to pass a forged instrument and executed a search of
his person incident to that arrest. In searching the defendant's jacket,
an officer removed a plastic wrapped foil packet which, upon further
intrusion and unwrapping, was found to contain drugs. Justice Erwin,
writing for the majority, held that the search of the packet which had
been extracted from the defendant's jacket was not so extensive as
to exceed the boundaries of search incident to arrest.2 59 In so holding,
the Alaska Supreme Court gave Chimel a very narrow reading, limiting it to its facts. Because Chimel involved the impermissible extension of a search incident to an arrest into an adjoining room, the Alaska
Supreme Court reasoned that the scope of person searches incident to
arrest was not governed by Chimel and the dual rationales of Frankfurter's dissent in Rabinowitz .260 Thus, McCoy sustained not only the
seizure, but also sustained the search of the foil packet as incident to
arrest, notwithstanding the fact that there was no likelihood that the
evidence, once seized, would be destroyed or that such evidence posed
a danger to the police officer who had seized it.
Justices Rabinowitz and Connor vigorously dissented in McCoy.
In that case, and in each subsequent case which has raised a similar
issue, both Justices Rabinowitz and Connor have indicated that
searches incident to arrest, whether of "persons" or of "premises,"
should be limited to situations in which one of the two rationales which
provide the conceptual and practical basis for the exception to the
warrant requirement are present. Thus, once the evidence is seized and
there is no possibility that it could be destroyed, and if such evidence
does not pose a danger to officers, Justices Connor and Rabinowitz
would require that officers obtain a search warrant for making a further
intrusion into the seized evidence. Therefore, in situations similar to
that in McCoy, unless officers could establish probable
256. 339 U.S. 56 (1950).
257. 395 U.S. 752 (1969).
258. 491 P.2d 127 (Alaska 1971).

259. Id. at 136-37.
260. Id. at 136.
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cause to believe that the foil packet contained contraband, (which the
dissenting justices doubted could have been established), a lawful
search could not be executed.
It is worth questioning, however, whether McCoy remains good
law in Alaska. Written by Justice Erwin, and joined in by then Chief
Justice Boney and Justice Dimond, the majority view in McCoy
reflects the opinions of three justices no longer present on the Alaska
Court.
Two subsequent cases bear on the issue of the scope of the exception . In Lemon v. State ,261 a search of the defendant's clothes and the
subjecting of them to laboratory analysis for evidence was upheld by
the supreme court as a permissible search incident to an arrest. The
only apparent limitation on scope articulated by Lemon is that there
must be probable cause to believe that evidence of the crime for which
26 3
262
the arrest has been made may be found. Finally, Hanby v. State
involved the seizure of obscene movie films. The court indicated that
materials protected by the first amendment to the Constitution may
but may
not be seized within the search incident to an arrest exception,
264
be taken by a warrant founded upon probable cause.
Exigency Exceptions
In addition to the two exigencies which justify searches incident
to arrest, protection of the officer and prevention of the destruction of
evidence, several other exigent circumstances have been deemed sufficient to justify a warrantless search or seizure. While Alaska has never
specifically adopted a "hot pursuit" exception to the warrant requirement, dicta in two cases recognizes that such an exigency could
support a warrantless search and seizure. Erickson v. State265 and
Schraff v. State266 identify hot pursuit as a warrant exception, both
cases citing Warden v. Hayden.267
The exigency of emergency conditions has been held sufficient to
sustain a warrantless search or seizure. In Stevens v. State,26 the
warrantless entry of a house by police officers was held to be reasonable because of the emergency created by the recent firing of a gun.
In Ferguson v. State,269 officers had made several entries into a
dwelling in investigating an arson case. The court noted, without
comment, that the emergency exception had properly not been advanced
as a basis for justifying the search. Finally, the Court in Schraff v.
E.

261.
262.
263.
264.
265.
266.
267.
268.
269.

514 P.2d 1151 (Alaska 1973).
Id. at 1158.
479 P.2d 486 (Alaska 1970).
Id. at 495-96.
507 P.2d 508 (Alaska 1973).
544 P.2d 834 (Alaska 1975).
287 U.S. 294 (1967).
443 P.2d 600 (Alaska 1968).
488 P.2d 1032 (Alaska 1971).
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State270 declined to sustain the warrantless search of a suspect pursuant
to the emergency exception because of his intoxicated condition and
declined to apply the emergency exception because the defendant, at
the time of the search, was at least partially conscious; because the
officer making the search was a narcotics officer, not involved in either
rescue or treatment, and because the search had been executed with
motives other than rendering assistance. Concerned about possible
abuse of the emergency exception to the warrant requirement by
police officers, Justice Boochever, in his concurring opinion, articulated a test which he would use in applying the emergency exception. Justice Boochever's test considers:
. . .[W]hether a reasonable police officer, acting under the
totality of the circumstances as they appear to him at the
time, would believe that a medical emergency existed (an
imminent and substantial threat to life or health) and that a
search of the sick or271
injured person for immediate identification was necessary.
Thus, the majority opinion and Justice Boochever's concurring
opinion suggest by implication that the search of an unconscious
person in a true emergency situation for the purpose of establishing the
person's identification would be permissible. This approach overlaps
272
with the "implied consent" theory mentioned in State v. Stevens
and derived from United States v. Barone.273
The final exigency exception involves the inherent mobility of
automobiles as a justifying circumstance for a warrantless search.
Alaska has specifically declined to rule on this exception.
The roots of the mobility exception are found in a string of federal
cases beginning with Carrollv. United States .274 In the Carrollcase,
the United States Supreme Court held that police could stop a car on
the highway and search it without a warrant if they had probable cause
to believe the car was transporting contraband. The reason for this
exception to the search warrant requirement was that the mobility of
the automobile made it impracticable to obtain a search warrant, since
the car and its illegal contents could be out of the jurisdiction before
the warrant could be served. Subsequently, in Preston v. United
States,275 the court invalidated the search of an automobile on the
ground that the search could not be sustained even under Carroll
because the automobile had, in fact, been immobilized. Six years later,
in Chambers v. Maroney,276 the court retreated from Preston, while
purporting to distinguish it, and extended the Carrollrule far beyond
270.
271.
272.
273.
274.

544 P.2d 834 (Alaska 1975).
Id. at 848.
443 P.2d 600 (Alaska 1968).
330 F.2d 543 (2nd Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 1004 (1964).
267 U.S. 132 (1925).

275. 376 U.S. 364 (1964).
276. 399 U.S. 42 (1970).
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its original rationale. Although Preston expressly stated that if the
police had probable cause to search the vehicle, they had to obtain a
warrant once the exigent circumstances of mobility were removed, the
court in Chambers distinguished Preston as a situation where there
was no probable cause to search. Chambers upheld the later search at
the station house of the automobile on the theory that there was still
probable cause to search and the automobile was still mobile .277
Then in Coolidge v. New Hampshire,278 the court drew back
somewhat from the great latitude allowed automobile searches in
Chambers. In Coolidge, the police impounded a vehicle, took it to the
police station, and searched it without a warrant two days later. The
court held that this situation did not come within the Carrollexigency
exception to the warrant requirement because: By no possible stretch
of the legal imagination can this be made into a case where "it is not
,279
practicable to secure a warrant ....
In Daygee v. State,28° the Alaska Supreme Court specifically
bypassed the opportunity to squarely address the mobility issue. The
majority of the court declined to either adopt or reject the Chambers
approach. Daygee sustained the warrantless search of the vehicle as
within the search incident exception. Only Justice Fitzgerald would
have sustained the search on the basis of the rule of Chambers.
Justices Rabinowitz and Connor, again joining in dissent, rejected
outright the holding of the majority in Chambers. Instead, they preferred the view advocated by Justice Harlan in his separate opinion in
Chambers. Justice Connor stated: "If the police have probable cause to
search a detained vehicle, they should seize it, postponing any search
until they have obtained a warrant satisfying the consitutional requirements. This procedure would reconcile the claims of both individual
' 21 l
privacy and effective law enforcement.
Thus, Justices Connor and Rabinowitz favor an approach which
would relieve law enforcement officers of the burden of making
distinctions between vehicles exhibiting sufficient mobility to justify a
warrantless search and vehicles exhibiting insufficient mobility. In
standardizing the warrant requirement by comparing, automobile
searches to house searchers, wrote Justice Connor, ". . . we intend to
avoid the confusion that now exists because proper procedure is difficult to determine at the scene of the arrest."282
Of the presently constituted court, only Justices Rabinowitz and
Connor have gone on record with respect to the mobility exception to
277.
278.
279.
280.
281.
282.

Id.
403
Id.
514
Id.
Id.

U.S. 443 (1971).
at 462.
P.2d 1159 (Alaska 1973).
at 1169.
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the warrant requirement, and they have specifically rejected the view
of Chambers v. Maroney. Thus, the status of this exception remains
an open question in Alaska.
F.

Summary
The exceptions to the warrant requirement constitute one significant area in which the Alaska Supreme Court has departed from the
prevailing federal view. The inventory search exception, presently the
subject of consideration by the court in Zehrung v. State,283 will
almost certainly be resolved in a more limited fashion than the federal
rule if any consistency with Alaska's treatment of other search and
seizure issues is to be maintained. With the resignation of Justice
Erwin, author of the decision in McCoy v. State,284 the limits of
searches incident to arrest may undergo some rethinking by the court.
Should Chief Justice Boochever or Justices Burke or Matthews adopt
Justice Rabinowitz's view that searches incident to arrest are limited
by the two exigencies which are the basis for that exception, a new rule
limiting the intensity of searches incident to arrest will emerge.
In accordance with Coleman v. State,285 stops and frisks on less
than probable cause are permissible in Alaska only where a police
officer has a reasonable suspicion that imminent public danger exists
or serious harm to persons or property has recently occurred. This
approach marks one of the more significant departures from federal
286
law.
Of the exigency exceptions, neither "hot pursuit" nor "mobility" has been adopted in Alaska. The mobility exigency exception
would appear to be of particular dubious vitality in Alaska given its
outright rejection by Justices Rabinowitz and Connor in Daygee v.

State

287

IV.

ANALYSIS OF SEARCHES AND SEIZURtS BY TYPE -

PREMISES,

PERSON, AUTO

Alaska search and seizure cases can be grouped according to the
area or item searched. Reviewing the cases in this light reveals slight
differences of approach and philosophy with respect to searches of
homes, persons, and automobiles. Alaska cases reflect a policy of
favoring protection of homes. While Justices Rabinowitz and Connor
have advocated subjecting automobiles to the same search and seizure
rules as homes,2 88 the status of cars in Alaska is not settled.
283. 569 P.2d 189 (Alaska 1977). See Post-Script infra for a discussion of the Supreme
Court's opinion in this case.
284. 491 P.2d 127 (Alaska 1971).
285. 553 P.2d 40 (Alaska 1976).
286. See Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40 (1968); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
287. 514 P.2d 1159 (Alaska 1973).
288. See Daygee v. State, 514 P.2d 1159 (Alaska 1973).
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Premises Searches
Searches of homes may be grouped into those executed with a
warrant and those executed without a warrant but sustained by one of
the exceptions to the warrant requirement. The Alaska Supreme Court
has frequently balanced search and seizure principles against the special consideration and protection afforded houses. In Fresneda v.
State,289 Chief Justice Boney quoted Judge Learned Hand, stating
that, ". . . it is one thing to search a man's pocket and something else
to ransack his entire house for everything which may incriminate him,
having gained lawful entry in order to affect an arrest."290
Cases involving warrantless searches of houses have received
some of the closest scrutiny of the Alaska Supreme Court. Warrantless
premises searches in Alaska have involved four exceptions to the
warrant requirement. Brown v. State29 1 and Sleziak v. State 292 upheld
warrantless searches of houses on the grounds that they had been
executed pursuant to a valid and voluntary consent. While the
emergency exception to the warrant requirement can, under certain
circumstances, justify the warrantless entry into a house, as in Stevens
v. State,29 3 where the firing of a gun was held sufficient to justify a
warrantless entry, the Alaska court has condemned the use of the
exception when used as a mere pretext to gain entry to a
emergency
294
house.
Several warrantless intrusions into dwellings have been upheld by
the Alaska court on the grounds that no search had occurred. Thus, in
Robinson v. State ,295 the court sustained a seizure from the windowsill
of a house, saying there had been no search of the premises. Robinson
rested in part on the very narrow definition given by the court to what
constituted the confines of the house. Similarly, in Smith v. State, 296
the court held that the intrusion by police officers into the garbage
dumpster of an apartment building did not constitute a violative search.
Smith rested on the narrow definition of the privacy expectation
interest retained by the defendant in his home. And in J.M.A. v.
State,297 the search by a state licensed and paid foster parent of her
foster child's effects and bedroom was held not to be governed by the
fourth amendment.
The most vital area of warrantless searches of homes has involved
the extension of a search incident to an arrest into adjoining rooms of a
A.

289.
290.
291.
292.
293.
294.
295.
2%.
297.

458 P.2d 134 (Alaska 1969).
Id. at 140-41.
372 P.2d 295 (Alaska 1962).
454 P.2d 252 (Alaska 1969).
443 P.2d 600 (Alaska 1968).
Ferguson v. State, 488 P.2d 1032 (Alaska 1971).
489 P.2d 1271 (Alaska 1971).
510 P.2d 793 (Alaska 1973).
542 P.2d 170 (Alaska 1975).
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house. Such intrusions were condemned by the Alaska court in Fresneda v. State2 9 8 and in State v. Spietz.2 99 Under limited facts, including a
substantial threat to officers executing an arrest from possible accomplices lurking in an adjoining room behind a curtain, the court permitted the extension of a search incident to an arrest to the adjoining room.300
A search of a house, done under a warrant, has posed considerably fewer problems for the Alaska court. Because of the court's
stated preference for warranted searches, few cases involving such
house searches have been reversed.
Davis v. State30 and the two Davenport cases3 2 sustained
303
searches executed within the scope of the warrant. Martel v. State
went so far as to permit the search of a garage as within the scope of a
warrant authorizing the search of a nearby house. Thus, in Martel,
which involved a warranted search, the court adopted a more expansive view of what was included in the confines of a "house" than did
the case in Robinson v. State," in which the warrantless seizure from
a windowsill of a house was upheld on the grounds that the intrusion of
the sill did not constitute a search of the house.3°5
Robinson, Smith, and Martel, taken together, reveal a result
orientation on the part of the Alaska court in applying a definition of a
"house." When a broad definition of what constitutes a house was
required to sustain a search, as in Martel, the court responded by
permitting a detached garage to be searched under the authority of a
warrant authorizing the search of a nearby house. When a narrow
definition of what constitutes a house was required to sustain a search,
however, as in Smith and Robinson, the court responded by permitting
police intrusions of a garbage dumpster and a windowsill on the
grounds that the occupant6 had not retained a reasonable expectation of
30
privacy in those areas.
Anderson v. State3°7 represents the only case in which the Alaska
Supreme Court has invalidated a premises search by police officers
equipped with a search warrant. Officers authorized by search warrant
to search for drugs observed photographic slides in the defendant's
apartment and held them to the light for scrutiny. In Anderson, the
298. 458 P.2d 134 (Alaska 1969).
299. 531 P.2d 521 (Alaska 1975).
300. Avery v. State, 514 P.2d 637 (Alaska 1973).
301. 525 P.2d 541 (Alaska 1974).
302. Davenport v. State, 515 P.2d 277 (Alaska 1973); State v. Davenport, 510 P.2d 78
(Alaska 1973).
303. 511 P.2d 1055 (Alaska 1973).
304. 492 P.2d 106 (Alaska 1971).

305. See also Smith v. State., 510 P.2d 793 (Alaska 1973), in which the court declined

to include a garbage dumpster as part of the constitutionally protected premises of the

defendant.
306. Warranted searches of homes were also sustained in State v. Shelton, 442 P.2d
404 (Alaska 1976); Kristin v. State, 550 P.2d 796 (Alaska 1976); Harrelson v. State, 516
P.2d 390 (Alaska 1973); Eliason v. State, 511 P.2d 1066 (Alaska 1973).
307. 555 P.2d 251 (Alaska 1976).
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court was compelled to acknowledge that the officers had strayed so
far from the directives of the warrant so as to require reversal.
Person Searches
All person searches reaching the supreme court for review have
been executed without a warrant. Of these cases, most warrantless
searches of persons have involved application of the search incident to
arrest exception. As Justice Rabinowitz noted in his dissent in McCoy
v. State,38 the great bulk of searches of the person are incident to
arrest.
Subsequently, searches incident to arrest have been sustained by
the Alaska Supreme Court in five cases. 3°9 But Peter v. Statea10 held
that the search of the defendant could not be sustained as incident to
the arrest because there had been no proper basis for an arrest. Similarly, in Schraff v. State,31 1 the court remanded the case to the trial court
for a determination of whether there was a basis for a proper arrest
necessary to sustain the search in that case as incident to arrest. And
Layland v. State 312 held that a search of the defendant, which involved
the taking of a blood sample could not be sustained as within search
incident because the arrest had not been made "substantially contemporaneous" with the search. Further, the Alaska court has carefully
finding no
scrutinized cases involving consent searches of the person,
313
valid consent to have been tendered in these cases.
Finally, in three cases the Alaska court sustained searches of the
person on the basis of stop and frisk. 314 And in Schraff v. State, 315 the
court declined to sustain the search of a suspect as within the emergency exception to the warrant requirement because the facts did not
reflect that the search had been executed in response to an emergency.
B.

Auto Searches
Like searches of the person, most automobile searches in Alaska
which have been conducted without a warrant have involved applicaC.

308. 491 P.2d 127 (Alaska 1971). See also Note, McIntyre and Chabraja, The Intensive Search of a Suspect's Body and Clothing, 58 J. CRIM.L.,CRIM. PoL.SCI. 18 (1967);
Constitutional Limitations on the Taking of Body Evidence, 77 YALE L.J. 1074 (1969);
Recent Development, Constitutional Law - Fourth Amendment - A "Search All
Persons" Powered - Does Presence Really Equal Probable Cause, 58 CORNELL L. REV.
614 (1973).
309. Lemon v. State, 514 P.2d 1151 (Alaska 1973); McCoy v. State, 491 P.2d 127
(Alaska 1971); Rubey v. State, 456 P.2d 470 (Alaska 1969); Maze v.State, 425 P.2d 235
(Alaska 1967); Goss v. State, 390 P.2d 220 (Alaska), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 859 (1964).
310. 531 P.2d 1263 (Alaska 1975).
311. 535 P.2d 1043 (Alaska 1975).
312. 544 P.2d 834 (Alaska 1975).
313. Layland v. State, 535 P.2d 1043 (Alaska 1975); Bargas v. State, 489 P.2d 130
(Alaska 1971); Rubey v. State, 456 P.2d 470 (Alaska 1969).
314. Coleman v.State, 553 P.2d 40 (1976); Maze v.State, 525 P.2d 235 (Alaska 1967);
Goss v. State, 390 P.2d 220 (Alaska), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 859 (1964).
315. 544 P.2d 834 (Alaska 1975).
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tion of the search incident to arrest exception. In three cases3 16 the
Alaska Supreme Court sustained the extension of searches incident to
the search of autoarrest to automobiles. Other cases have sustained
319
318
317
mobiles on the basis of stop and frisk, consent and plain view.
In Schraff v. State,32 the court cited Lee v. State, 32 1which stated
that under certain circumstances a vehicle may be lawfully "secured. "322 And in Mattern v. State,323 the court held that a van,
stopped on suspicion of connection to a burglary, could be entered to
prevent danger to the officer from possible accomplices.
As discussed previously, however, Alaska has never dealt with or
adopted the Carroll-Chambers-Coolidgeapproach to the mobility exception to the warrant requirement applicable to searches of automobiles. 324
V.

ANALYSIS OF SEARCH AND SEIZURE CASES BY JUSTICE/AUTHOR

Because appellate court dispositions reflect consensus decision
making, it is difficult to discern individual differences in philosophy
and style among the members of the court. Over time, and particularly
through examination of the issues on which justices of the court have
chosen to dissent, personal approaches to search and seizure problems
do emerge. What follows in this section is a brief examination of the
record of each member of the presently
constituted Alaska Supreme
325
Court on search and seizure issues.
Justice Dimond 326 has authored four majority opinions 327 and one
dissent. 328 In Bargas v. State,329 he articulated the requirement that
316. Daygee v. State, 514 P.2d 1159 (Alaska 1973); Merrill v. State, 423 P.2d 686
(Alaska 1967); Goss v. State, 390 P.2d 220 (Alaska), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 859 (1964).
317. See Coleman v. State, 553 P.2d 40 (Alaska 1976), where the court stated that
there was no distinction between stopping an automobile and stopping a pedestrian.
318. Christian v. State, 513 P.2d 664 (Alaska 1973).
319. See Pope v. State, 478 P.2d 801, reh. denied, 479 P.2d 486 (Alaska 1970).
320. 544 P.2d 834 (Alaska 1975).
321. 490 P.2d 1206 (Alaska 1971).
322. "Secured" is not defined in the case. It presumably involves locking or storing
the vehicle for safekeeping and the preservation of evidence pending the issuance of a
warrant.
323. 500 P.2d 228 (Alaska 1972).
324. The issue was discussed, but not decided, in Daygee v. State, 514 P.2d 1159
(Alaska 1973).
325. Because Justice Pro Tern John H. Dimond has continued to make significant
contributions to the development of Alaska search and seizure law during his retirement,
a review of his opinions is included in this section.
326. Justice John H. Dimond served on the Alaska Supreme Court from August 7,
1959, to December 1, 1971. Since his retirement, Justice Dimond has served, with some
frequency, as an Associate Justice pro tem.
327. Kristich v. State, 550 P.2d 7% (Alaska 1970); Bargas v. State, 489 P.2d 138
(Alaska 1971); Rubey v. City of Fairbanks, 456 P.2d 470 (Alaska 1969); Goss v. State,
390 P.2d 320 (Alaska), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 859, (1964).
328. State v. Stump, 547 P.2d 305 (Alaska 1976).
329. 489 P.2d 130 (Alaska 1971).
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there must be a valid arrest to sustain a search as incident to arrest.
Additionally, in Bargas, Justice Dimond wrote that prosecutors may
not comment on a defendant's exercise of his fourth amendment
rights. The most vital of Justice Dimond's search and seizure opinions
appeared in his dissent in State v. Stump.3 30 In that case Justice
Dimond was of the view that the airline employee's intrusion into a
package constituted an illegal search because it was made at police
behest. Justice Dimond, then, was the only member of the court to
scrutinize the relationship between the airline employee and the police
and find sufficient complicity to bring the search within constitutional
requirements.
Justice Matthews 3 3' has not yet authored a search and seizure
opinion.
Justice Burke 332 has authored only one search and seizure opinion. In Anderson v. State, 333 the seizure of photographic slides from
the defendant's apartment was invalidated as not authorized by a
warrant permitting search for drugs or by the plain view doctrine.
Anderson is the only Alaska case in which a search executed with a
warrant was found to be unlawful.
33
Chief Justice Boochever 334 has authored six majority opinions 1
and one concurring opinion. 336 Two of Chief Justice Boochever's most
important opinions involved private person searches. In Bell v.
State, 337 a search of a parcel by an airlines agent was held to be
permissible because the agent had not been acting at government
behest. Bell holds that clear and convincing evidence of the presence
of contraband is sufficient for a plain view seizure, leaving open the
question of whether some lesser standard of proof would suffice.
J.M.A. v. State338 held that a search of a foster child's effects by a
foster parent, acting in a private capacity, does not violate the fourth
amendment. Both Bell and J.M.A. were disposed of by reasoning
that the persons executing the searches had been acting in a private
capacity, notwithstanding the evidence of police involvement. In
330. 547 P.2d 305 (Alaska 1976).
331. Justice Warren Matthews has served as an Associate Justice of the Alaska
Supreme Court since July 22, 1977.
332. Justice Edmond W. Burke has served as an Associate Justice of the Alaska
Supreme Court since April 4, 1975.
333. 555 P.2d 251 (Alaska).
334. Chief Justice Robert Boochever served as an Associate Justice of the Alaska
Supreme Court from March 15, 1972, to September 26, 1975, at which time he became
Chief Justice of the court.
335. Keller v. State, 543 P.2d 211 (Alaska 1975); J.M.A. v. State, 542 P.2d 170
(Alaska 1975); Peter v. State, 531 P.2d 1263 (Alaska 1975); Bell v. State, 519 P.2d 804
(Alaska 1974); Harrelson v. State, 516 P.2d 390 (Alaska 1973); Lemon v. State, 514 P.2d
1151 (Alaska 1973).
336. Schraff v. State, 544 P.2d 834 (Alaska 1975).
337. 519 P.2d 804 (Alaska 1974).
338. 542 P.2d 170 (Alaska 1975).
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Schraff v. State,339 Chief Justice Boochever in his concurrence found
that the search of the defendant could not be sustained as within the
emergency exception to the warrant requirement. His concurring opinion articulated a limited and carefully drawn standard for determining
the types of emergency situations in which a police officer may search
a person without a warrant.
Justice Connor, 31° in his ten majority opinions 34 I and one dissenting opinion 342 has authored several of the more important search and
seizure opinions. Smith v. State3 4 3 adopted Justice Harlan's twopronged test of the reasonableness of an expectation of privacy necessary to invoke fourth amendment protection. It was in Smith that
Justice Connor, speaking for the majority, permitted the search of a
garbage dumpster adjoining an apartment building on the grounds that
the defendant had not retained a reasonable expectation of privacy.
Smith represents one of the few major Alaska search and seizure
opinions in which Justices Connor and Rabinowitz have differed. They
joined in dissenting opinions in two significant cases. In Daygee v.
State, 34 Justice Connor joined Justice Rabinowitz in dissenting on the
propriety of the search of a car, stating that absent some exigency,
automobiles should be treated like houses. And Justice Connor dissented in McCoy v. State, 34 5 joined by Justice Rabinowitz, stating that
searches incident to arrest are limited by the two exigencies which are
the basis for the exception. Thus, in Justice Connor's view, once the
threat of destruction of evidence has been removed and no danger is
posed to the officer, a search warrant must be obtained to sustain any
further intrusion.
Finally, by virtue of his lengthy tenure on the court and by his
346
personal interest in fourth amendment issues, Justice Rabinowitz
has played a major role in the development of Alaska's search and
seizure law. He is the author of thirteen majority opinions,347 five
339. 544 P.2d 834 (Alaska 1975).
340. Justice Roger G. Connor has served as an Associate Justice of the Alaska
Supreme Court since January 28, 1969.
341. Schraff v. State, 544 P.2d 834 (Alaska 1975); Davis v. State, 525 P.2d 541 (Alaska
1974); Davenport v. State, 515 P.2d 377 (Alaska 1973); Christian v. State, 513 P.2d 664
(Alaska 1973); Smith v. State, 510 P.2d 793 (Alaska 1973); Mattern v. State, 500 P.2d 228
(Alaska 1972); Robinson v. State, 489 P.2d 1271 (Alaska 1971); Hanby v. State, 479 P.2d
486 (Alaska 1970); Morris v. State, 473 P.2d 603 (Alaska 1970); Klockenbrink v. State,
472 P.2d 958 (Alaska 1970).
342. Daygee v. State, 514 P.2d 1159 (Alaska 1973).
343. 510 P.2d 793 (Alaska 1973).
344. 514 P.2d 1159 (Alaska 1973).
345. 491 P.2d 127 (Alaska 1971).
346. Justice Jay A. Rabinowitz served as an Associate Justice of the Alaska Supreme
Court from March 5, 1965, until the death of then Chief Justice George S. Boney in
August, 1972. From August 31, 1972, to September 26, 1975, he served as Chief Justice

of the Alaska Supreme Court, and has served as an Associate Justice of the court since
that time.
347. Stange v. State, 559 P.2d 650 (Alaska 1977); Layland v. State, 535 P.2d 1043
(Alaska 1975); Avery v. State, 514 P.2d 637 (Alaska 1973); Eliason v. State, 511 P.2d
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dissenting opinions, 348 and one concurring opinion. 349 In McGalliard
v. State,350 Justice Rabinowitz sustained, as a private person search,
an intrusion into a shipping van, applying for the first time the Corngold test of police involvement. In Bell v. State,35 Justice Rabinowitz
authored the first historical and scholarly opinion of the court reviewing the particularly requirement. He set out a three-pronged test to
determine the validity of the seizure of evidence not itemized in a
warrant, requiring that the evidence be reasonably related to the crime
which serves as the basis for the warrant, that there be a reasonable
basis for connecting such evidence to criminal activity, and that the
seizure be executed in good faith by police officers. In Layland v.
State ,352 he wrote that a blood sample could be obtained from a person
charged with operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated in three
ways: by consent, by search warrant, or by search incident to arrest. In
Mattern v. State, 35 3 Justice Rabinowitz dissented, disapproving of the
search of a van because the record was devoid of evidence of any
necessity of checking inside the van for accomplices. Finally, in Smith
v. State, 3 Justice Rabinowitz vigorously dissented from the majority's conclusion that the search of a garbage dumpster adjoining an
apartment building was permissible without a warrant. In Smith,
Justice Rabinowitz favored adoption of a differential expectation of
privacy analysis, suggesting that one who deposits refuse into a
dumpster might expect some minor intrusion or examination by third
persons, but such exceptions would not necessarily include a detailed
and systematized inspection of the garbage by law enforcement officers. Over the years, Justice Rabinowitz has been consistent in narrowly construing the exceptions to the warrant requirement and in demanding that a warrant be procured wherever practicable.
CONCLUSION
The framework of Alaska's search and seizure law has been built
through the fifty-two cases discussed and analyzed in this article. In
several areas, however, important nuances of the law will be developed in the coming years. The Alaska Supreme Court's docket of
1066 (Alaska 1973); Martel v. State, 511 P.2d 1055 (Alaska 1973); State v. Davenport, 510
P.2d 78 (Alaska 1973); Jackson v. State, 509 P.2d 278 (Alaska 1973); Bell v. State, 482
P.2d 854 (Alaska 1971); McGalliard v. State, 470 P.2d 275 (Alaska 1970); Sleziak v. State,
454 P.2d 352 (Alaska 1969); Drahosh v. State, 442 P.2d 44 (Alaska 1968); Weltz v. State,
431 P.2d 502 (Alaska 1967); Merrill v. State, 423 P.2d 686 (Alaska 1967).
348. Schraff v. State, 544 P.2d 844 (Alaska 1975); Daygee v. State, 514 P.2d 1159
(Alaska 1973); Smith v. State, 510 P.2d 793 (Alaska 1973); Mattern v. State, 500 P.2d 288
(Alaska 1972); McCoy v. State, 491 P.2d 127 (Alaska 1971).
349. Stevens v. State, 443 P.2d 600 (Alaska 1968).
350. 470 P.2d 275 (Alaska 1970).
351. 482 P.2d 854 (Alaska 1971).
352. 535 P.2d 1043 (Alaska 1975).
353. 500 P.2d 228 (Alaska 1972).
354. 510 P.2d 793 (Alaska 1973).
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search and seizure cases has been steadily on the increase since
statehood. Nearly half of the search and seizure cases have been
litigated in just the past five years; moreover, the supreme court is
averaging five cases in this area each year.
In the area of exceptions to the warrant requirement, three topics
in particular will almost certainly be the subject of resolution. First, the
court will have to provide some additional guidelines in the area of
stop and frisk. In Coleman v. State, 355 the Alaska Supreme Court
limited stops and frisks on less than probable cause to "situations
requiring immediate police response to protect the public in serious
cases where there is a likelihood of imminent danger about to occur or
where serious harm has recently been perpetrated to persons or property.,"356 It would seem obvious that under Coleman stops and frisks are
limited to a very narrow range of situations. Because the trial courts
following the Coleman decision have exhibited some confusion and
disagreement concerning the types of situations in which police officers are permitted to stop and frisk a person on less than probable
cause, 357 it is likely that the supreme court will have to provide still
additional guidance concerning what types of situations are appropriately characterized as involving "serious harm" or "imminent
danger."
The "search incident" exception to the warrant requirement may
also be the subject of some rethinking on the part of the court.
Particularly, the expansive view of the permissible intensity of a search
358
incident to arrest adopted by the supreme court in McCoy v. State
may be revised or overruled. Justice Erwin, who resigned from the
court last spring, was the last remaining member of the majority in
McCoy; Chief Justice Boochever, Justice Burke, and Justice Mattthews have never directly addressed the issue. Should one or more of
them adopt the position of Justices Rabinowitz and Connor in their
dissent in McCoy, a new rule concerning the permissible intensity of
searches incident to arrest in Alaska may emerge. Specifically,
searches incident to arrest may be limited in intensity to the protection
of an officer or the prevention of destruction of evidence of the crime
for which the person was arrested.
Furthermore, the Alaska Supreme Court must soon come to grips
with the propriety of inventory searches in prison. In accordance with
355. 553 P.2d 40 (Alaska 1976).
356. Id. at 46.
357. See, e.g., State v. Milton, Case 76-5079 Cr. (1976), reversed on appeal to the

Superior Court, in which the trial court sustained the stop and frisk of the passenger of
an automobile after the driver had been arrested for a minor misdemeanor. See also

State v. Billings, 76-6308 Cr. (1976), in which the trial court sustained the stop and frisk
of a suspect after having been informed that a vehicle, similar to the one the suspect was
driving, had been observed driving away from a building whose windows had been shot
out some undetermined time earlier.
358. 491 P.2d 127 (Alaska 1971).
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their view requiring a warrant for auto searches, 359 and their view
limiting searches incident to arrest to the two exigencies which provide
the basis for that exception,3 6 Justices Rabinowitz and Connor will
almost certainly decline to adopt an inventory search exception to the
warrant requirement.
For the most part, the law of search and seizure in Alaska is
consistent with the prevailing view of the United States Supreme
Court. The court has declined, however, to follow the federal lead in
several critical areas. 36' Moreover, the state constitution has been the
source and the basis 362
for much of the search and seizure doctrine which
is unique to Alaska.
POST-SCRIPT

Subsequent to the submission of this article for publication, the
of
Alaska Supreme Court took steps towards resolving two major areas 363
search and seizure law. A unanimous decision in Zehrung v. State
boldly set the constitutional limitations for inventory searches and
searches incident to arrest in Alaska.
In Zehrung the defendant had been stopped for a minor traffic
offense, excessive smoke emanating from his vehicle. A routine records check by officers revealed two outstanding warrants for his arrest
for misdemeanor offenses. 364 Zehrung was arrested and transported to
the city jail.
While being processed and "booked" at the jail, 365 Zehrung's
wallet was searched by corrections personnel. The search revealed two
credit cards found to be in another person's name. The credit cards
were eventually linked to a rape to which Zehrung pled nolo contendere after having reserved his rights to appeal the propriety of the
jailhouse search of his wallet.
Adopting reasoning from a line of similar cases, 366 the Alaska
Supreme Court held that because the justifications for a pre-incarceration inventory search 367 do not exist if the arrestee is not to be
359. Daygee v. State, 514 P.2d 1159 (Alaska 1973).
360. McCoy v. State, 491 P.2d 127 (Alaska 1971).
361. See, e.g., text accompanying notes 206-29 supra.
362. ALASKA CONST. art. 1, § 14.
363. 569 P.2d 189 (Alaska, 1977).
364. One warrant had been issued upon Zehrung's failure to appear for trial on a
concealment of merchandise charge arising out of his alleged theft of a sixteen cent fuse;
the other warrant had been issued for his failure to pay a twenty-five dollar fine for
possession of marijuana.
365. The opinion in Zehrung details the processes ordinarily involved in "booking."
366. See People v. Dixon, 392 Mich. 691,221 N.W.2d 749(1974); cf., United States v.
Mills, 472 F.2d 1231 (D.C. Cir. 1972); People v. Overlee, 174 Colo. 202, 482 P.2d 222
(1971); State v. Gwinn, 12 Or. App. 444, 506 P.2d 187 (1973).
367. These justifications are typically to prevent the entry of money, contraband and
weapons into the jail, to protect the arrestee's property, and to protect the jail against
arrestee claims for lost or damaged property. See State v. Kaluna, 55 Haw. 361, 520 P.2d
51, 60-61 (1974).
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incarcerated, a warrantless inventory search may not be conducted in
such cases. 36 8 Justice Dimond, in a scholarly opinion for the unanimous court, stated:
Without deciding the general question of whether inventory
searches in such cases may constitute an exception to the
requirement of a search warrant, we hold in this case that the
search was illegal in the absence of a warrant. The jail had
been provided with a bail schedule for petty offenses, the
purpose of which was to afford an arrestee such as Zehrung
the opportunity to avoid incarceration by posting the established bail without need to appear before a magistrate. If one
is arrested for a petty offense and has sufficient funds on his
person to pos the established bail when brought to the jail
facility, he should be released immediately. There is no
reason to subject an arrestee to booking procedures with the
resultant inventory search of his person since he is not to be
incarcerated. 69
The court also declined to validate the search of Zehrung's wallet on
the grounds that it had been executed "incident to" his arrest. The
court adhered to the requirement articulated in McCoy v. State37 ° that
for a search to be permissible as incident to an arrest, "the arrest must
be for a crime, evidence of which could be concealed on a person. "371
The court noted: "However, in our view, the right to be "secure...
against unreasonable searches and seizures," under Article I, section
14 of the Alaska Constitution, requires that governmental intrusions
into the personal privacy of Alaska citizens be limited in scope to that
degree necessary under the particular circumstances. "372
Thus, the opinion in Zehrung represents a continued acceptance
of the McCoy case by the present Alaska Supreme Court. The rigid
application of the analysis of McCoy in Zehrung, however, does
represent a move, on the part of the current court, towards the position
historically adopted by Justices Rabinowitz and Connor. In prohibiting
incidental searches of persons arrested for crimes evdence of which
could not be concealed on their person, Zehrung analytically alignes
the court more closely with the limited view of the permissible scope
and intensity of searches incident to arrest espoused by Justices
Rabinowitz and Conner in their joint dissent in McCoy.
368. The court in Zehrung declined to pass on whether fingerprinting and photographing an arrestee is justified where the arrestee is to be released on bail. See Zehrung
v. State, 569 P.2d 189, at 193, n. 12 (Alaska, 1977). Justice Burke, in his concurring
opinion in Zehrung, suggested the propriety of detention of even bailable arrestees for
such a time as may be reasonably necessary to allow authorities to fingerprint and
photograph the accused.
369. Id. at 194-95.
370. 491 P.2d 127 (Alaska 1971).
371. Id. at 138 (footnotes and citations omitted).
372. 569 P.2d 189 at 199 (footnote omitted).

